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I. INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights in the United States enjoy legal pro-
tection under federal copyright,' patent,' and trademark3 laws
dating back to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 4 and
grounded in the Constitution.' Although such domestic laws pro-
1. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
2. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994).
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
4. The United States passed its first copyright law in 1790, see Sherri L. Burr, The Pi-
racy Gap: Protecting Intellectual Property in an Era of Artistic Creativity and Technological
Change, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 245, 247 (1997) (citing Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1
Stat. 124), its first patent law in 1790, see Edward C. Walterscheid, The Winged Gud-
geon-An Early Patent Controversy, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 533, 533
(1997) (citing Act of April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109), and its first trademark law in 1870, see
William T. Vuk, Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the European Union Should
Revise the 1989 Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trademarks, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 861, 877-78 (1998) (citing Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16
Stat. 198,210-12).
5. Federal authority over copyrights and patents derives from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."). This provision does not give Congress authority
over trademarks, however. See In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879). Federal
authority over trademarks derives instead from the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."). See Ironite Co. v.
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vided adequate legal protection in the early years of the Republic,
the sudden growth in international literary activity in the late nine-
teenth century caused greater numbers of creative works to cross
national boundaries and to enter into nations lacking legal protec-
tion for intellectual property.6 To ensure continued legal protec-
tion for their intellectual works in a more global economy, inter-
ested citizens in the United States and other nations put pressure
on their national governments to afford international protection
for their works.7 Although U.S. intellectual property laws were
not given extraterritorial effect,8 the cumulative result of these ef-
forts was a panoply of international treaties designed to ensure
that signatories provided minimum levels of legal protection to in-
tellectual propertyY As a result of these international accords, a
great number of nations now provide at least some legal protection
for intellectual property."
Guarantee Waterproofing Co., 64 F.2d 608, 610-11 (8th Cir. 1933); Cross v. Oneida Paper
Products Co., 117 F. Supp. 919, 922 (D.NJ. 1954).
6 See Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the Future, 3
J.L. & TECH. 1, 7-8 (1988).
7. See id at 8.
& See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (holding that
the U.S. patent laws do not have extraterritorial effect); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe
Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the US copyright
laws generally do not have extraterritorial effect); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234
F.2d 633, 643 (2d Cir. 1956) (refusing to give extraterritorial effect to Lanham Act's
trademark provisions).
9. See Trademark Law Treaty, Oct. 27, 1994, reprinted in WIPO, INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES,
MULTILATERAL TREATIES 1-12 (Jan. 1995) (trademark); General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uru-
guay Round of Trade Negotiations, Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights, Annex IC, Apr. 15 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81, 1197-225 [hereinafter TRIPS]
(various types of intellectual property rights); Universal Copyright Convention, openedfor
signature Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T.
1341, 943 U.N.T.S. 1 (copyright); Patent Cooperation Treaty, opened for signature June 19,
1970,28 U.S.T. 7645,1160 U.N.T.S. 231,232 (patent); Convention on Literary and Artistic
Copyrights, Aug. 11, 1910, 38 Stat. 1785, 40 Martens (3d) 315 (copyright); Berne Conven-
tion for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 12
Martens (2d) 173 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (copyright); Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13 U.S.T. 1, revised July 14, 1967, 21
U.S.T. 1583,828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (patent).
10. As of 1995, there were 105 signatories to the Berne Convention and 46 signatories
to the Universal Copyright Convention. See Alexander A. Caviedes, International Copy-
right Law: Should the European Union Dictate Its Development?, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 165,
173 n.51 (1998). As of March 26, 1997, there were 142 signatories to the Paris Convention.
See John Richards, Recent Patent Law Developments in Asia, 7 FORDHAM INTELL PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 599,600 n.4 (1997).
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Given modem advances in transportation, communications, and
technology, most intellectual property is now available throughout
the world and, consequently, is simultaneously covered by the in-
tellectual property laws of several nations. Moreover, the advent
of the Internet means that one can, by posting a web site contain-
ing one's intellectual property on the Internet, become instantane-
ously and simultaneously protected by the intellectual property
laws of over one hundred nations; at the same time, one who posts
information on the Internet that potentially infringes on someone
else's copyright, trademark, or patent could instantly become sub-
ject to the intellectual property laws of-and subject to suit in-
over one hundred nations."
The applicability of the intellectual property laws of multiple
sovereigns to a single act of infringement has led to strategic be-
havior by both plaintiffs and defendants that threatens to under-
mine both the deterrent goal of intellectual property laws12 and the
salutary effect of finality provided by the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel. 3 Defendants who wish to make it difficult
for plaintiffs to collect damages in infringement actions touching
on the laws of multiple sovereigns ask U.S. courts to dismiss claims
brought under the laws of foreign sovereigns, so as to force plain-
tiffs to undertake the time-consuming and expensive task of main-
taining separate suits in multiple fora. 4 Equally problematic are
11. See Dan L. Burk, Trademark Doctrines for Global Electronic Commerce, 49 S.C. L.
REV. 695,729-31 (1998); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of
Law-tn Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370-78 (1996); Petition for Writ of Certiorari
at 15-16, Altai, Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998) (No. 97-1417)
("When infringing works are distributed over the Internet, causes of action will arise in
numerous Berne-member countries almost simultaneously. In each forum, copyright in-
fringement litigation may be initiated.").
12. See Video Aided Instruction, Inc. v. Y & S Express, Inc., No. 96 CV 518 CBA, 1996
WL 711513, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1996) (holding that under the Copyright Act, an
award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party is within the court's discretion, and is in-
formed in each case by "the need to advance the goals of the Copyright Act, namely com-
pensation and deterrence") (emphasis added) (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,
535 n. 19 (1994)).
13. See U.S. v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81, 83 (6th Cir. 1977) ("The doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel have the salutary effect of bringing litigation to a final resolution
and preventing repetitive suits over the same matter."); Price v. Worldvision Enterprises,
Inc., 455 F. Supp. 252, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The doctrine of res judicata, where applica-
ble, has a salutary effect in the law. Parties are relieved of the burden and expense of reli-
tigating the merits of a claim previously established. Relitigation of decided issues are
equally wasteful of the resources of the trial courts.") (emphasis added), affd, 603 F.2d 214
(2d Cir. 1979).
14. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp.
119, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss foreign claims where
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plaintiffs who take "multiple bites at the apple"'' by bringing suit
for infringement in one forum under that forum's law and who, af-
ter losing at trial and on appeal, bring subsequent suits in other
fora on nearly identical facts and under nearly identical laws.'6
Common sense would dictate that defendants who force plaintiffs
to claim-split likely do so because the plaintiffs' claims are strong,
while plaintiffs who purposely claim-split are more likely to have
weak or frivolous claims. The possibility of such strategic behavior
discourages the bringing of meritorious claims and encourages the
bringing of frivolous claims.
U.S. federal courts have at their disposal several tools that they
can use to prevent such strategic behavior. First, if a plaintiff
brings an action in a U.S. court under U.S. intellectual property
laws, but holds in reserve potential claims arising under the intel-
lectual property laws of other nations, the U.S. court can issue an
antisuit injunction to bar the plaintiff from bringing claims in for-
eign fora under foreign laws. 7 Second, where a plaintiff brings an
action in a U.S. court under U.S. intellectual property laws, but has
a claim pending in foreign courts under a similar foreign law, the
U.S, court can dismiss the action under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and encourage the plaintiff to amend his foreign claim
to include the claims arising under U.S. law.' 8 Third, where a
plaintiff brings an action in a U.S. court under U.S. intellectual
property laws, but the plaintiff has already prosecuted a compara-
ble claim in a foreign court under foreign intellectual property
laws, the U.S. court can either apply the doctrine of res judicata to
plaintiff brought suit under U.S. copyright law and the copyright laws of 18 foreign na-
tions), affd in part and rev'd in part, 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
15. Johnson v. State of Kansas, 888 F. Supp. 1073, 1080 (D. Kan. 1995) (noting that the
Rooker-Feldnan doctrine, which bars direct review in the lower federal courts of a deci-
sion reached by a state's highest court, provides a measure of finality in a manner similar
to that provided by the claim preclusion doctrine), aftd, 81 F.3d 172 (10th Cir. 1996).
16. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 48,49-51 (1996) (de-
clining to enjoin plaintiff, who litigated and lost claim in U.S. court under U.S. copyright
law, from pursuing subsequent action against defendant in French court under French
copyright law), affd 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied 118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998).
17. Cf., e.g., Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624,627-28 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming
issuance of antisuit injunction where defendant filed claim in foreign court that duplicated
counterclaim for breach of contract that could be brought in U.S. action).
18. See, e.g., Creative Technology, Ltd. v. Aztech System PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 699-
702 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissing copyright infringement suit in favor of action in Singapore
court and noting that foreign court can adjudicate U.S. claim in addition to adjudicating
any claims under Singapore law).
199?9]
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bar the claim 19 or apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to pre-
vent the plaintiff from relitigating facts already decided in the
prior litigation.20 Finally, to prevent strategic behavior by defen-
dants, U.S. courts can permit plaintiffs to bring claims under the
intellectual property laws of multiple sovereigns and refuse to
honor requests by defendants to dismiss the foreign claims under
the forum non conveniens doctrine.2'
Unfortunately, conflicting standards among the federal circuits
over the applicability of these inherent powers in the transnational
intellectual property context and the divided authority regarding
the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts over foreign intellectual
property claims severely hamper the ability of federal district
courts to use these tools in such a manner so as to prevent parties
in transnational intellectual property suits from engaging in strate-
gic behavior. This Comment seeks to reconcile these conflicts
where possible and, where irreconcilable, to demonstrate that the
text and history of federal statutes conferring subject matter juris-
diction on federal courts and placing limits on their issuance of an-
tisuit injunctions, as well as historical developments in federal
common law, strongly support the exercise of jurisdiction over,
and the use of preclusion doctrine, antisuit injunctions, and forum
non conveniens dismissals in, transnational intellectual property
disputes.
Part II of this Comment examines the conflict among the federal
courts over whether U.S. federal courts have subject matter juris-
diction to hear claims brought under foreign intellectual property
laws,' and concludes that in most circumstances, federal courts
can exercise subject matter jurisdiction over such claims under a
number of different statutory grants of jurisdiction. Part III ex-
19. See., e.g., Hunt v. BP Exploration Co., 580 F. Supp. 304, 310 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (giv-
ing preclusive effect to English money judgment where the claims in the U.S. action "de-
rive[d] from the same nucleus of operative fact").
20.' See, e.g., Leo Feist, Inc. v. Debmar Publishing Co., 232 F. Supp. 623, 623-24 (E.D.
Penn. 1964) (applying doctrine of collateral estoppel to a claim of U.S. copyright infringe-
ment based on a prior action in a British court under English copyright law).
21. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481,
491-92 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that forum non conveniens analysis dictates against dis-
missing claims under the copyright laws of 18 foreign nations).
22. Compare, e.g., Quantitative Fin. Software, Ltd. v. Infinity Fin. Tech., Inc., No. 97
CIV. 7879(LMM), 1998 W, 427710, at *1-*3 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1998) (finding no subject
matter jurisdiction to hear claim arising under Israeli copyright law), with Ortman v. Stan-
ray Corp., 163 U.S.P.Q. 331, 333-34 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (finding subject matter jurisdiction to
hear claim arising under Canadian, Brazilian, and Mexican patent laws), rev'd on other
grounds, 437 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1971).
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amines the question whether the Act of State doctrine prevents
U.S. courts from adjudicating claims of infringement arising under
foreign intellectual property laws,' and concludes that the doc-
trine does not bar the adjudication of such claims. Part IV exam-
ines whether infringement actions in foreign fora under foreign in-
tellectual property laws can raise the bar of res judicata or
collateral estoppel,24 and concludes that U.S. courts can and should
make more aggressive use of these doctrines, notwithstanding sub-
stantial precedent that on its face suggests otherwise. Part V ex-
amines the conflict over whether U.S. courts should hear intellec-
tual property claims arising under foreign law or instead dismiss
them on forum non conveniens grounds z and concludes that the
equities weigh in favor of taking whatever action is necessary to
ensure that all claims surrounding a given act of infringement are
consolidated in the same forum. Finally, Part VI examines the
competing criteria for issuing antisuit injunctions, 6 and concludes
that U.S. federal courts should apply the more liberal standard,
which gives them the power to issue such injunctions whenever
necessary to avoid vexatious behavior or unnecessary duplication
and expense.
Although the adoption by U.S. courts of the liberal standard for
granting antisuit injunctions, standing alone, would raise legitimate
23. Compare, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 646 (2d Cir. 1956)
(refusing to hear case that requires court to determine validity of foreign trademark based
on act of state doctrine), with Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287,
1293-94 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that the granting of patents is not the kind of governmen-
tal afion contemplated by the act of state doctrine).
24. Compare, e.g., E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d
1525, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that judgments of foreign courts involving foreign
intellectual property rights have no effect whatsoever on U.S. judgments), with Leo Feist,
Inc. v. Debmar Publishing Co., 232 F. Supp. 623, 623-24 (E.D. Penn. 1964) (applying doc-
trine of collateral estoppel to a claim of U.S. copyright infringement based on a prior ac-
tion in a British court under English copyright law).
25. Compare, eg., S. Megga Telecomm. Ltd. v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., No. 96-357-
SLR, 1997 WL 86413, at *11 (D. Del. Feb. 14, 1997) (dismissing claim under Chinese in-
tellectual property law on forum non conveniens grounds), with Boosey & Hawkes Music
Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that fo-
rum non conveniens analysis dictates against dismissing claims under the copyright law of
18 foreign nations).
26r- Compare, e.g., China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36-
37 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding antisuit injunctions to be appropriate only where the foreign ac-
tion threatens the jurisdiction of the enjoining forum or where strong public policies of the
enjoining forum are threatened by the foreign action), wid Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 24
F.3d 245, 1994 WL 192428, at **2 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding antisuit injunctions appropriate
where pursuit of foreign litigation can result in inconsistent rulings, and where there is a
likelihood of unnecessary delay, substantial inconvenience and expense).
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fears that efficiency concerns will displace comity for foreign sov-
ereigns, this Comment argues that such fears would be substan-
tially mitigated if U.S. courts simultaneously apply the doctrines of
forum non conveniens, res judicata and collateral estoppel with
equal vigor. In other words, if U.S. courts are more willing to al-
low suits involving U.S. intellectual property rights to proceed to
final judgment in foreign courts, and to bar their duplication in
U.S. proceedings through the use of forum non conveniens, res ju-
dicata and collateral estoppel, then they have justification to issue
antisuit injunctions to ensure that transnational intellectual prop-
erty suits initiated in a U.S. court are not pursued in parallel or
subsequent proceedings abroad. Under such circumstances, the
issuance of foreign antisuit injunctions does not contravene no-
tions of international comity because it will represent not a policy
of U.S. judicial imperialism but rather one of primacy for the
plaintiff's first chosen forum (assuming the chosen forum adjudges
itself to be a convenient forum for the litigation).
Moreover, although the liberal use of antisuit injunctions to pre-
vent piecemeal transnational intellectual property litigation ap-
pears to conflict with "the rule favoring parallel proceedings in
matters subject to concurrent jurisdiction," z this Comment dem-
onstrates that this "rule" has been imported into the transnational
litigation context from case law grounded in domestic federalism
concerns. This Comment concludes that the justification for the
rule in the domestic context-the preservation of dual sovereignty
within a federal system-is simply inapposite in the transnational
context, in which generally sophisticated, repeat players in an in-
creasingly global economy are primarily concerned with the effi-
cient adjudication of their claims.
I. FEDERAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS
ARISING UNDER FOREIGN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
A critical but seldom discussed prerequisite for determining
whether or not a U.S. court should enjoin a foreign proceeding (or
dismiss its own proceeding in favor of a foreign forum) in a trans-
national intellectual property dispute is the determination whether
the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims
arising under foreign law (or whether the foreign forum has sub-
27. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 928 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (citation omitted).
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ject matter jurisdiction over the claims arising under U.S. law2v).
Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction,
subject to the constraints imposed by Article llF2 and limited to
the statutory grants of power given by Congress.30 It would be un-
fair to punish a party for failing to bring all of his claims in the
same forum if that forum lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear
all the claims in the first instance.3 1 Unfortunately, courts adjudi-
cating transnational intellectual property disputes often assume,
without providing any justification, that they do32 or do not3 have
subject matter jurisdiction, or simply proceed to exercise subject
matter jurisdiction without even raising the issue.3
Potential sources of statutory jurisdiction over claims arising
under the intellectual property laws of both the United States and
foreign nations include patent, copyright, and trademark jurisdic-
tion,35 U.S. treaty jurisdiction,36 unfair competition jurisdiction, 3
28. Of course, any limitation on the ability of foreign courts to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over claims arising under U.S. intellectual property law would be determined
by the laws of those nations and not by Article III of the U.S. Constitution or any act of
Congress. See Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 703 (9th Cir.
1995) ("As a foreign nation, Singapore is not bound by acts of Congress as the fifty states
are under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.").
29. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea-
ties[,] .. . to Controversies ... between Citizens of different States... and between a State
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.").
30. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512-13 (1969) ("[A] federal district court
lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter... if the cause is not one described by any juris-
dictional statute.").
31. See generally RESTATE!MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1980) (noting
that a "jurisdictional competence" exception to the general rule against splitting a cause of
action applies if plaintiff was unable to assert a particular claim or theory in the original
case "Because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction" of the court).
32. See, e.g., Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764,766-67 (9th
Cir. 1991) (stating that "ft]he district court had jurisdiction over th[e] suit under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (federal claims), § 1332(a) (diversity) & § 1338 (copyright)," in suit raising ques-
tions under both U.S. and foreign copyright laws).
33. See, eg., Sperry Rand Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp., 285 F.2d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 1960)
("The parties are agreed that the United States District Court may not adjudicate ques-
tions of foreign trademark rights even though the parties to such controversies might be
properly before it in another case.")
34. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481
(2d Cir. 1998) (reversing trial court's forum non conveniens dismissal of copyright claims
brought under the laws of 18 foreign nations without raising the issue whether a U.S. court
has subject matter jurisdiction to hear such claims).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety pro-
tection, copyrights and trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of
the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.").
1999]
340 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
supplemental jurisdiction, 38 diversity jurisdiction, 9 alienage juris-
diction, 40 and alien tort statute jurisdiction.41 Although one need
only find jurisdiction under one of these statutory provisions, this
part of the Comment considers each of these sources of subject
matter jurisdiction so as to determine the ability of a U.S. district
court to exercise jurisdiction. Table 1 lists twenty-nine possible
scenarios for such a suit brought in a U.S. court and the jurisdic-
tional provision covering each, if one exists.
36. See id. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.") (emphasis added).
37. See id. § 1338(b) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related
claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws.").
38. See id. § 1367(a) ("[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original ju-
risdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of
the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such
supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.").
39. See id. § 1332(a)(1) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000... and is be-
tween... citizens of different States.").
40. See id. § 1332(a)(2)-(3) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000... and is
between ... (2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of
different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties").
41. See id. § 1350 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.").
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Table 1
Characteristics of Possible Suits in U.S. Courts
Scenario Plaintiff Defendant Law Amount in Complete Jurisdictional
Controversy Diverslty42  ProvisIons
U.S. U.S. U.S. § 1338(a)
2 U.S. U.S. Foreign At least one not satisfied None
3 U.S. U.S. Foreign Satisfied Satisfied § 1332(a)(1)
444 U.S. U.S. Both § 1338(a) (U.S.
claim only);
§ 1367(a); maybe
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . § 13 3 8 (b )
5a45  U.S. Foreign U.S. .. § 1338(a)
5b 6  Foreign U.S. U.S. _ § 1338(a)
6a U.S. Foreign Foreign Not satisfied None
6b Foreign U.S. Foreign Not satisfied None
7a U.S. Foreign Foreign Satisfied .......... § 1332(a)(2)
Foreian Foreign
8a U.S. Foreign Both
§ 1332(a)(2)
§ 1338(a) (U.S.
claim only);
§ 1367(a); maybe
§ 1338(b)
42. Where the plaintiffs and defendants are U.S. citizens, "complete diversity" refers to
the situation in which none of the plaintiffs are from any of the states which any of the de-
fendants are from. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267,267-68 (1806) over-
Mued on other grounds, Louisville, C & CR. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
43. See, e.g., George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1944)
(New York corporation suing New York corporation under U.S. trademark law).
44. See, e.g., Berkshire Furniture Co., Inc. v. Glattstein, 921 F. Supp. 1559 (W.D. Ky.
1995) (Delaware corporation suing Kentucky corporation under U.S., British, and Malay-
sian copyright laws).
45. See, e.g., Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365
F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Counterclaim by New York corporation against German
corporation under U.S. trademark law), affd as modified, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
46..See, e.g., Calzaturificio Rangoni S.p.A. v. United States Shoe Corp., 868 F. Supp.
1414 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (Italian corporation suing Ohio corporation under U.S. trademark
law).
47. See, e.g., London Film Productions Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc.,
580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (British corporation suing New York corporation under
British copyright law).
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Table 1 (continued) _________________
Scenario Plaintiff Defendant
8b49  Foreign U.S. Both
950 Foreign Foreign U.S.
10 Foreign Foreign Foreign
11 Foreign Foreign Both
1251 U.S. Both U.S.
Both
Amount in Complete Jurisdictional
Controversy Diversity Provisions
ii~~ti":i: : ' :..... ii iii :i i§ 1338(a) (U.S.
. N claim only);
Zj:2.:i § 1367(a); maybe
S- ... .:....
.:.-..- §1338(a)
",:~~ ~~ .. ....:::::::
i:: None
---- - i  1338(a) (U.S.§1367(a); maybe
t;. ~ ~~ ~ 1338(b cai ol);
§ 1338(a)
Foreign At least one not satisfied None
14 U.S. Both Foreign
15 U.S. Both Both
1652 Foreign Both U.S.
§ 1332(a)(3)
§ 1338(a) (U.S.
claim only);
§ 1367(a); maybe
S§1338b)
§ 1338(a)
48. See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (Delaware corporation suing Japanese corporation under U.S. and Japanese patent
laws).
49. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 934 F. Supp.
119 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (British corporation suing U.S. corporation under U.S. copyright law
and the copyright laws of 18 foreign nations), affd in part and rev'd in part, 145 F.3d 481
(2d Cir. 1998).
50. See, e.g., Fuji Photo Film Co., Inc. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d
591 (5th Cir. 1985) (Japanese corporation suing Japanese corporation under U.S. law).
51. See, e.g., Liberty Toy Co., Inc. v. Fred Silber Co., 149 F.3d 1183 (6th Cir. 1998)
(Ohio corporation suing Michigan and Canadian corporations under U.S. copyright laws).
52. See, e.g., Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Singapore corporation suing Singapore and California corporations under U.S. copyright
law).
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Table 1
Characteristics of Possible Suits in U.S. Courts
Scenario Plaintiff Defendant Law Amount in Complete Jurisdictional
Controversy Diversity4 2  Provisions
143  U.S. U.S. U.S. . § 1338(a)
2 U.S. U.S. Foreign At least one not satisfied None
u IT . TT F nreio Rndfipji I qflGod 8 1"a (n(1
44 U.S. U.S. Both
5a45  U.S. Foreign U.S.
5b 6 Foreign U.S. U.S.
Foreign
7a Foreign I _U.S. Foreign Notsatisfied
7a U.S. Foreign Foreign Satisfied
Foreign I U.S. Foreign
sa4 U.S. Foreign Both
§ 1338(a) (U.S.
claim only);
§ 1367(a); maybe
§ 1338(b)
§ 1338(a)
§ 1338(a)
None
None
§ 1332(a)(2)
§ 1332(a)(2)
§ 1338(a) (U.S.
claim only);
§ 1367(a); maybe
§ 1338(b)
42. Where the plaintiffs and defendants are U.S. citizens, "complete diversity" refers to
the situation in which none of the plaintiffs are from any of the states which any of the de-
fendants are from. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806) over-
ruled on other grounds, Louisville, C & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
43. See, e.g., George NV. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1944)
(New York corporation suing New York corporation under U.S. trademark law).
44. See eg., Berkshire Furniture Co., Inc. v. Glattstein, 921 F. Supp. 1559 (W.D. Ky.
1995) (Delaware corporation suing Kentucky corporation under U.S., British, and Malay-
sian copyright laws).
45. See, eg., Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365
F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (Counterclaim by New York corporation against German
corporation under U.S. trademark law), affd as modified, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
46..See, eg., Calzaturificio Rangoni S.p.A. v. United States Shoe Corp., 868 F. Supp.
1414 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (Italian corporation suing Ohio corporation under U.S. trademark
law).
47. See, e.g., London Film Productions Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc.,
580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (British corporation suing New York corporation under
British copyright law).
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Although some of these scenarios are obscure,57 the purpose of
cataloguing and considering the universe of scenarios is to deter-
mine what types of controversies are outside the competency of
U.S. courts, and thus to determine under what circumstances, if
any, a U.S. court should in fairness refrain from issuing antisuit
injunctions or forum non conveniens dismissals in attempting to
control transnational intellectual property litigation.
A. Patent, Copyright, and Trademark Jurisdiction
A natural starting point for determining whether a U.S. court
has subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under foreign in-
tellectual property law is 28 U.S.C. §1338(a), which grants U.S dis-
trict courts original jurisdiction over actions arising under federal
patent, copyright and trademark laws, and exclusive5" jurisdiction
over cases arising under patent and copyright laws.59 Although
this provision unquestionably provides subject matter jurisdiction
for claims arising under U.S. intellectual property law, 6° its plain
language belies any effort to extend its coverage to claims arising
under foreign intellectual property laws:6 "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act
of Congress relating to patents, ... copyrights and trade-marks."62
One theory is that international treaties that the United States has
entered into, such as the Universal Copyright Convention63 or the
Berne Convention,' 4 are "Acts of Congress" within the meaning of§ 1338(a), and thus any foreign intellectual property law that stems
57. Particularly scenarios 2, 3, 6a, 6b, 7a, 10, 11, 13 through 15, 20 through 22, and 24
through 29, for which the author was unable to find reported cases.
58. "Exclusive jurisdiction" means that federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over state courts; it does not prevent a U.S. court from dismissing claims brought under
U.S. intellectual property laws in favor of a foreign forum in a forum non conveniens dis-
missal. See Creative Tech., Ltd. v. Aztech Sys. PTE, Ltd., 61 F.3d 696, 699-703 (9th Cir.
1995). See also Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 768-69
(9th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds of a case brought
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338). In this sense, "exclusive jurisdiction" differs from a "mandatory
venue" provision. See Creative Tech., 61 F.3d at 699-700.
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994).
60. Accordingly, it could provide the basis for jurisdiction in scenarios 1, 5a, 5b, 9, 12,
16, 19, 23, and 26, and for the U.S. claims raised in scenarios 4, 8a, 8b, 11, 15, 18, 22, 25,
and 29.
61. See Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Patent Claims, 66 MICH. L. REV. 358, 359(1967) ("[T]he statutory language does not purport to cover claims arising under the pat-
ent laws of other countries.") (citation omitted).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (emphasis added).
63. Universal Copyright Convention, supra note 9.
64. Berne Convention, supra note 9.
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from such treaties is also an "Act of Congress."'  However, courts
construe this provision narrowly to refer almost exclusively to ac-
tions arising under federal statutes.6 Moreover, even assuming
arguendo that courts would construe § 1338(a) to include such in-
ternational accords as the Paris Convention,67 the Berne Conven-
tion, or the Universal Copyright Convention, these treaties are not
self-executing and thus do not create enforceable causes of action
independent of any causes of action created by implementing leg-
islation within the member nations.6s In light of these significant
obstacles, it seems highly unlikely that any court will find subject
matter jurisdiction under § 1338(a). Moreover, because these trea-
ties do not create independent causes of action, federal question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 would also be unavailable as
the action cannot "aris[e] under ... treaties of the United
States." 69
B. Unfair Competition Jurisdiction
Another theory under which a federal court can exercise origi-
nal jurisdiction over a foreign intellectual property law claim is
through the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b). Under this provision, a
district court has subject matter jurisdiction over any action as-
serting a claim of "unfair competition" if the claim is "joined with
a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant
65. Alan G. Kirios, Territoriality and International Copyright Infringement Actions, in
22 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 69,72 (Columbia Univ. Press 1977).
66. See id. at 72-73 (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964)); 2
MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 131.11 (1972).
67. Paris Convention, supra note 9.
68. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-568, §§ 2-3, 102
Stat. 2853, 2853 (declaring that the Berne Convention is not self-executing, and that its
provisions are not enforceable through action brought pursuant to the Convention itself);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298-99 (3d Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing that Paris Convention is not self-executing and accordingly does not provide an en-
forceable private cause of action); Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154,156-57 (7th Cir.
1967) (noting that ratification of the Paris Convention, "without any further action by the
Congress, is not sufficient to make the provisions of the Convention a basis for federal ju-
risdiction"); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 640-41 (2d Cir. 1956) (noting
that the Paris Convention does not create rights outside of those protected by the national
laws of member countries); Quantitative Fin. Software, Ltd. v. Infinity Fin. Tech., Inc., No.
97 CIV. 7879(LMM), 1998 WL 427710, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1998) (noting that the
Berne Convention is not self-executing and accordingly does not provide an enforceable
private cause of action for infringement of an Israeli copyright); Kirios, supra note 65, at
73 (noting that the Universal Copyright Convention confers no rights independent of the
individual national laws implemented by member nations).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
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variety protection or trade-mark laws."70 If the phrase "unfair
competition" encompasses infringements on foreign intellectual
property rights, § 1338(b) is a plausible provision under which to
bring a claim, assuming that one also has a colorable claim under
U.S. law with which to join the foreign claim, because § 1338(b),
unlike § 1338(a), does not require that the claim of unfair competi-
tion arise under an act of Congress.
At least one lower court has held that subject matter jurisdiction
over a foreign intellectual property claim is proper under this the-
ory. In Distillers Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,7 a federal district court
held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over a counterclaim for
infringement on the defendant's foreign patents when joined with
a counterclaim under the U.S. patent laws.72 The court defined the
term "related claim" to mean "that there be an overlapping of
probative facts from the main federal claim to the nonfederal
[claim,] " and found that the counterclaim for unfair competition
due to plaintiff's alleged infringement on defendant's foreign pat-
ents was "sufficiently related" to the defendant's claim that plain-
tiff's U.S. patents were invalid under U.S. patent law.74 The court
stressed:
It cannot be doubted ... that this Court is empow-
ered to consider claims arising under foreign patents
.... The mere fact that the rights... spring from an
exclusive license under foreign patents does not of
itself preclude the vindication of those rights from
being considered a claim related to one arising un-
der United States patent laws.75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux76 soundly rejected
this theory. In Mars, the plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, sued a
Japanese corporation under U.S. and Japanese patent laws, alleg-
ing that the district court could exercise subject matter jurisdiction
over the Japanese patent law claim under, inter alia, § 1338(b).77
Although the court recognized that the goal of § 1338(b) is "to
70. Id. § 1338(b).
71. 150 U.S.P.Q. 42 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
72. See id. at 47.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 43-44, 47.
75. See id. at 47.
76. 24 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
77. See id. at 1370-71.
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avoid 'piecemeal' litigation,"- it noted that "infringement of patent
rights, domestic or foreign, is not generally recognized as coming
within the rubric of 'unfair competition."' 9  Citing precedent
within the Federal Circuit holding that statutes conferring federal
subject matter jurisdiction are to be narrowly construed, and
finding no clear evidence that Congress intended to include claims
of foreign patent infringement within the category "unfair compe-
tition," the Federal Circuit held that, as a matter of law, § 1338(b)
does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts to
hear claims of patent infringement under foreign law.8'
Because the Federal Circuit now has exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from district courts involving patent law u Mars is control-
ling and Distillers is no longer good law, at least in cases involving
foreign patent law. However, the Distillers theory is applicable to
unfair competition claims based on alleged infringement of foreign
copyrights or trademarks, as the Federal Circuit's exclusive juris-
diction does not extend to intellectual property claims that do not
involve patent or plant variety protection actions.83 Thus, subject
matter jurisdiction could be proper in any case in which the parties
joined a claim under foreign copyright or trademark law with one
under U.S. copyright or trademark law.s4 However, no published
opinion to date has relied on § 1338(b) to confer subject matter ju-
risdiction over such claims. The unwillingness of federal courts to
rely on § 1338(b) to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over for-
eign copyright or trademark claims is most likely because the uni-
verse of cases in which the exercise of jurisdiction under § 1338(b)
is proper is fully subsumed within the universe of cases in which
the exercise of jurisdiction under the supplemental jurisdiction
statute15 is proper.8 Accordingly, if a court fails to find that it has
78. Id. at 1372.
79. Id. at 1373.
80. See id. at 1373 (citing Livingston v. Derwinski, 959 F.2d 224,225 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
8L See id.
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (1994) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of a dis-
trict court ... if the jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on section
1338 of this title, except that a case involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress
relating to copyrights, exclusive rights in mask works, or trademarks and no other claims
under section 1338(a) shall be governed by sections 1291,1292, and 1294 of this title").
83. See id.
84. Accordingly, it could provide the basis for jurisdiction for the foreign claims raised
in scenarios 4, 8a, 8b, 11, 15,18,22,25, and 29.
85. For a discussion of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, see infra Part I.c.
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jurisdiction under the supplemental jurisdiction statute, there is no
need for it to consider whether it has jurisdiction under §
1338(b). 87
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction
A more promising theory of subject matter jurisdiction that is
similar to unfair competition jurisdiction, but which avoids the fic-
tion of trying to fit one's claim within the rubric of "unfair compe-
tition," is the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). 88 The supplemental jurisdiction statute codified the
United States Supreme Court's decision in United Mine Workers
of America v. Gibbs,89 which held that a federal court may prop-
erly exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a state claim when
joined with a federal claim where the relationship between the two
claims is such "that the entire action before the court comprises
but one constitutional 'case' .... The state and federal claims must
86. This raises an important question: if there are no situations in which jurisdiction ex-
ists under § 1338(b) but is lacking under § 1367, why does § 1338(b) exist? The answer lies
largely in the fact that § 1338(b)-a narrow version of § 1367 focused solely on intellectual
property suits-predates the more general § 1367. Compare Act of June 25, 1948, c. 646,
62 Stat. 869, 931 (enacting § 1338(b)), with Act of December 1, 1990, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113,
Pub.L. 101-650, Title III, § 310(a) (enacting § 1367)). When Congress enacted § 1367, it
considered repealing § 1338(b) but failed to do so. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Case
Against Supplemental Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: A Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy
Analysis, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 801 n.445 (1994); accord Amy B. Cohen, "Arising
Under" Jurisdiction and the Copyright Laws, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 337,389 n.224 (1993). Al-
though this has resulted in an "absence of clarity of the relationship between § 1367 and ...
§ 1338(b)," Arthur D. Wolf, Comment on the Supplemental-Jurisdiction Statute: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, 74 IND. L. J. 223, 234 (1998), the literature merely suggests that if § 1338(b) has any
remaining effect whatsoever, it is to modify and narrow § 1367 rather than to supplement
it in any way. See id; Block-Lieb, supra, at 801-02 n.445. Moreover, the suggestion that §
1338(b) narrows § 1367 as applied to intellectual property claims is strongly disputed. See
Block-Lieb, supra, at 801n.445 ("[Congress'] inaction does not provide an unequivocal in-
dication of its intention."); Cohen, supra, at 389 n.224 ("Given the broad remedial pur-
poses of section 1367,... it seems more likely that Congress intended thereby to expand
the supplemental jurisdiction already available for copyright, patent, plant protection, and
trademark claims through section 1338(b)."), and as yet lacks support in the case law.
87. Cf. John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary
Liability for Trademark Infringement, 80 IOWA L. REV. 101, 135 n.125 (1994) ("Even if a
court were to conclude that [a] claim did not satisfy § 1338(b), it could invoke § 1367.").
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994). In 1990, Congress combined and codified the federal
common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in § 1367, and collectively re-
named the doctrines as "supplemental jurisdiction." See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET. AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 869 (2d ed. 1995). Because some of the
cases and comments cited in this section pre-date the 1990 statute, they use the term "pen-
dent" jurisdiction, which in substance has the same prerequisites as does supplemental ju-
risdiction.
89. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."'  Although
Gibbs involved a state law claim, the language of § 1367 refers not
to state law claims but rather to "all other claims." 91
The first opinion to broach the possibility of exercising supple-
mental jurisdiction over foreign intellectual property claims was
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's
opinion in Ortman v. Stanray Corporation.92 In Ortman, an Illinois
plaintiff brought suit against a Delaware corporation, alleging in-
fringement of U.S., Canadian, Brazilian and Mexican patent rights,
and the defendant challenged the lower court's subject matter ju-
risdiction over the foreign patent claims.93 On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit considered, among other bases for subject matter jurisdic-
tion,94 the possibility of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over
the foreign patent claims.95 The Seventh Circuit determined that
the reasoning in Gibbs would apply to foreign claims as well as
state claims, and concluded that the trial court could exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction if it determined that the causes of action
comprised a single constitutional case.96 On remand, the trial
court determined that "charges arising from the sale and manufac-
ture of the same instrumentality in various countries clearly arises
from 'a common nucleus of operative fact,"' and concluded that it
had subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign patent law causes
of action under the test enunciated by the Seventh Circuit.9
The efficacy of the Ortman theory is somewhat unclear.
Shortly after Ortman was decided, the same district court that
heard Ortman assumed that it had subject matter jurisdiction over
a patent infringement case involving U.S. and foreign patent
90. Id. at 725 (citation omitted).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
92. 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967).
93. See id. at 155-56.
94. The Ortman court also considered the possibility of subject matter jurisdiction un-
der the Paris Convention, see supra note 68, and via diversity jurisdiction, see infra Part
II.d.
95. See Ortman, 371 F.2d at 157-58.
96. See id. at 158.
97. See Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 163 U.S.P.Q. 331, 334 (N.D. IM. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 437 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1971).
98. One author suggests that the precedential value of Ortman is uncertain because
when it returned to the Seventh Circuit, that court indicated that the defendant remained
entitled to challenge the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, but "[n]o final resolution
of the jurisdictional issue in Ortman was ever reported." David R Toraya, Note, Federal
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Copyright Infringement Actions-An Unsolicited Reply to Pro-
fessor Nimmer, 70 CORNELL L REV. 1165,1176 (1985).
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rights,99 but declined to hear the foreign patent claims on forum
non conveniens grounds.1' ° More recently, Ortman was distin-
guished, although not reversed, by the Federal Circuit in Mars,
Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux,101 the same court that
held subject matter jurisdiction improper under the unfair compe-
tition statute. 2 The Mars court held that, "in contrast to Ort-
man," the case at issue in Mars involved not the same device pat-
ented under the laws of two different countries, but rather two
different devices, and that the alleged acts of infringement involv-
ing each of the two devices were different. 3 The Mars court's de-
cision to distinguish rather than to overrule Ortman, particularly
when it had shown a willingness to reject other theories of subject
matter jurisdiction "as a matter of law,"1 4 may signal a willingness
to accept claims of subject matter jurisdiction under the supple-
mental jurisdiction statute.105
If the Ortman theory is viable in the patent law setting, it holds
more promise in the area of transnational copyright litigation.
One critic of Ortman suggests that transnational patent infringe-
ment claims arguably do not meet the "common nucleus of opera-
tive fact" test.' 6 The argument is that to prove one's claim of U.S.
patent infringement (i.e., the federal claim), a plaintiff must dem-
onstrate both the validity of his U.S. patent and the acts that con-
stituted infringement.'" As the U.S. patent laws do not have ex-
traterritorial effect, proof of these elements will consist entirely of
acts consummated within the United States. 8 Because the actions
that prove the elements of foreign patent infringement consist en-
tirely of acts consummated outside of the United States, a common
nucleus of fact between the two claims is always lacking, and thus
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the foreign patent
99. See Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408, 408
(N.D. Ill. 1972).
100. See id. at 409-11.
101. 24 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
103. See Mars, 24 F.3d at 1375.
104. Id. at 1373 ("We hold as a matter of law that a claim of infringement of a foreign
patent does not constitute a claim of unfair competition within the meaning of section
1338(b).").
105. Accordingly, it could provide the basis for jurisdiction over the foreign claims in
scenarios 4, 8a, 8b, 11, 15, 18,22, 25, and 29.
106. Kirios, supra note 65, at 76.
107. See id.
108. See id.
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claim is always impermissible.1 9 In the realm of copyright in-
fringement, however, the existence of the Universal Copyright
Convention means that proof that one has complied with the for-
malities of perfecting a U.S. copyright will nearly always determine
if copyright protection has been secured under the copyright laws
of the signatory nations.'- Accordingly, in transnational copyright
disputes, the Universal Copyright Convention ensures that the
evidence needed to prove the existence of the domestic and for-
eign copyrights arises from a common nucleus of operative facts,
making the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction possible."'
Moreover, in the realm of the Internet, where the actual act of in-
fringement may consist of the simple act of posting an infringing
document on a website, n2 the actual act of infringement will be the
same for both the domestic and the foreign copyright infringement
claims, thus making the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction gen-
erally permissible. Given that the Mars court left open the possi-
bility that a federal court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a foreign patent claim by failing to overrule Ortman, notwith-
standing the criticism in the literature that transnational patent in-
fringement claims do not meet the "common nucleus of operative
fact" test, and given that this criticism is inapplicable in the copy-
right context, Mars thus provides even stronger support for the
conclusion that federal courts can exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion over foreign copyright claims. In other words, what is good
law for transnational patent litigation is even better law for trans-
national copyright litigation.
D. Diversity and Alienage Jurisdiction
There are at least two major problems associated with the theo-
ries of subject matter jurisdiction discussed thus far. First, each of
them rests on somewhat uncertain doctrinal ground, and their ap-
plicability will vary greatly depending on the particular facts and
circumstances involved. Second, and of somewhat greater con-
cern, is that except for patent, copyright, and trademark jurisdic-
109. See id
110. See id at 67 & n.67 (noting that under the Universal Copyright Convention, an
author ensures copyright protection in signatory nations by placing the "@D" symbol fol-
lowed by his name and the first date of publication on all copies of his copyrighted work).
111. See id. at 77-78. The exercise of jurisdiction is merely possible and not certain be-
cause proving the validity of the domestic and foreign intellectual property rights is one of
two necessary conditions for proving infringement. See supra text accompanying note 107.
112. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
1999]
352 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
tion (which rests on the shakiest of doctrinal grounds), the afore-
mentioned theories require the presence of a viable U.S. intellec-
tual property claim. Accordingly, those whose U.S. copyrights
have lapsed,"3 or those who are suing someone who has infringed
on multiple foreign copyrights but over whom personal jurisdiction
can be found only within the United States, will be locked out of
federal court.
A potential method of ensuring that such cases can be heard in
federal court, and one that rests on rather solid doctrinal ground, is
to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the diversity'14 and
alienage jurisdiction provisions." 5  Under diversity jurisdiction,
complete diversity is required; in other words, no plaintiff can be
from the same state as any defendant, and any overlap will defeat
diversity jurisdiction."6 Under alienage jurisdiction, the diversity
requirements are somewhat more complicated. First and fore-
most, a suit between foreign citizens based on a nonfederal claim,
even if the foreign citizens are from different nations, is unauthor-
ized by the alienage jurisdiction statutes, and most importantly, is
also outside the Article III powers of the federal courts; alienage
jurisdiction is possible only where at least one of the parties to the
dispute is a citizen of a U.S. state."7 Alienage jurisdiction also
does not provide jurisdiction where a U.S. citizen and an alien at-
tempt to sue another alien, or where an alien attempts to sue a
U.S. citizen and an alien. 18 Moreover, although some lower fed-
eral courts will find subject matter jurisdiction where a citizen of a
U.S. state and an alien are suing a citizen of a different U.S. state
113. See, e.g., London Film Prod., Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F.
Supp. 47,48 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
114. Under the domestic diversity provision, a federal court can exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over any civil action, including a foreign one, provided that the suit is "be-
tween citizens of different States" and that the amount in dispute exceeds $75,000. 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1994).
115. Under the alienage jurisdiction provisions, which confer jurisdiction over suits in
which citizens of foreign nations are parties, the amount in controversy requirement is the
same as that for the domestic diversity provision. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)-(3) (1994).
116. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267,267-68 (1806), overruled on other
grounds, Louisville, C & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
117. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491, 492 & n.18
(1983).
118. See, e.g., Ed & Fred, Inc. v. Puritan Marine Ins. Underwriters Corp., 506 F.2d 757,
757-58 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding no diversity jurisdiction where Netherland Antilles corpo-
ration brought suit against Bermudan and Massachusetts corporations); Quantitative Fin.
Software, Ltd. v. Infinity Fin. Tech., Inc., No. 97 CIV. 7879(LMM), 1998 WL 427710, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1998) (finding no diversity jurisdiction over Israeli copyright claim
where citizen of Israel sued citizens from California, New York, and Turkey).
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and -another alien (i.e., Massachusetts and Italy versus Michigan
and Turkey),1 9 in some jurisdictions, the presence of aliens on
both sides of the dispute will defeat diversity jurisdiction.12 Fi-
nally, while some lower courts hold that alienage jurisdiction
reaches the situation in which foreign adversaries from the same
nation are joined with diverse U.S. parties (i.e., Mexico and Rhode
Island versus Mexico and South Dakota),121 some jurisdictions
hold that no subject matter jurisdiction exists in such circum-
stances.122 Accordingly, using diversity and alienage jurisdiction to
confer subject matter jurisdiction over foreign intellectual property
claims will fill some, but not all, of the gaps left by the previously
discussed theories. 123
Although few courts have opted to hear claims raised under for-
eign intellectual property laws where the basis for subject matter
jurisdiction is diversity or alienage jurisdiction, courts have gener-
ally recognized that they have subject matter jurisdiction to do so.
For example, in Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.,124 a Pennsylvania
corporation brought suit against a Canadian corporation under
U.S. patent law, the Paris Convention, and Canadian patent law.'21
The court found no valid claim under the first two causes of action,
leaving only the claim under Canadian law.12 As to this remaining
claim, the court assumed that it was dealing with a transitory cause
of action, and without any difficulty asserted that the basis for its
jurisdiction over the claim rested on diversity of citizenship.12V Al-
though the Vanity Fair court ultimately refused to hear the case, it
119. See; e.g., Transure, Inc. v. Marsh & McClennan, Inc. 766 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 (9th
Cir. 1985) (finding subject matter jurisdiction where Californian and British corporations
brought suit against Delaware and South African corporations).
120. See, eg., Hercules Inc. v. Dynamic Export Corp., 71 F.R.D. 101, 106 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)-(finding no subject matter jurisdiction where Delaware and Bahamian corporations
brought suit against New York and Iranian corporations).
121. See e.g., K & H Bus. Consultants Ltd. v. Cheltonian Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 420,420-24
(D.NJ. 1983) (finding subject matter jurisdiction where British and Delaware corpora-
tions brought suit against British and Texas corporations).
122. See, e.g., De Wit v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 570 F. Supp. 613, 617 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (finding no subject matter jurisdiction where a citizen of the Netherlands, though
then residing in the United States, brought suit against a Dutch corporation).
123. Accordingly, it could provide jurisdiction over the claims raised in scenarios 3, 7a,
7b, 14, and 21, might provide jurisdiction over the claims raised in scenario 28, and would
not provide jurisdiction in the remaining scenarios, 2, 6a, 6b, 10, 13,17,20,24, and 27.
124. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
125. See id at 637-38, 645.
126. See id. at 640-45.
127. See id. at 645.
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did so on act of state and forum non conveniens grounds, and not
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28
The next case to raise the potential for exercising diversity juris-
diction over a claim based on a foreign intellectual property law
was Judge Fairchild's concurring opinion in Ortman v. Stanray
Corporation.29 Judge Fairchild posited that a patent infringement
claim is a transitory tort claim, such that the courts of any sover-
eign and not just those of the sovereign that granted the patent
right may hear it.130 Accordingly, he concluded, so long as the pre-
requisites for diversity of citizenship are met, the claim could be
heard in any U.S. federal court.' On remand, the trial court ac-
cepted diversity of citizenship as an alternative basis for finding
subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign patent claims.132
Shortly thereafter, the same district court cited Judge Fairchild's
concurring opinion in Ortman with approval in finding subject
matter jurisdiction in another case involving patent infringement
claims based on U.S. and foreign patent laws. 33
The transitory cause of action theory for adjudicating foreign in-
tellectual property claims under diversity jurisdiction subsequently
was incorporated into Nimmer on Copyright, a major treatise on
copyright law. 14 Nearly 20 years after Ortman was decided, a fed-
eral court, largely relying on Nimmer's treatise, 35 imported the
theory into copyright law. In London Film Productions Ltd. v.
Intercontinental Communications, Inc.,136 a British corporation
brought suit against a New York corporation under British copy-
right law, and the federal court concluded that it had subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because the action was a transitory tort and the re-
quirements for diversity jurisdiction had been established.37
128. See id at 645-48. See also infra Part III (discussing act of state); infra Part V (dis-
cussing forum non conveniens).
129. 371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967).
130. See id at 159 (Fairchild, J., concurring).
131. See id. at 159-60.
132. See Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 163 U.S.P.Q. 331, 333-34 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (citing
Ortman, 371 F.2d at 159 (Fairchild, J., concurring), rev'd on other grounds, 437 F.2d 231
(7th Cir. 1971).
133. See Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408,408-09
(N.D. Il. 1972) (citing Ortman, 371 F.2d at 159 (Fairchild, J., concurring); Ortman, 163
U.S.P.Q. at 333).
134. See 4 MELVILLE B. & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (1998).
135. See London Film Prod., Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc., 580 F.
Supp. 47,48-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
136. 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
137. See id. at 48-49.
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Only one subsequent case has suggested that diversity jurisdic-
tion could not be exercised over a claim arising under a foreign in-
tellectual property law. In ITSI T. V. Productions, Inc. v. Califor-
nia Authority of Racing Fairs,"'8 a federal court adjudicating a U.S.
copyright claim refused to allow the plaintiff to amend his claim to
add a claim arising under Mexican copyright law after the U.S.
claim was dismissed, finding "no clear authority for exercising such
jurisdiction. '139 The reasons cited for refusing to exercise jurisdic-
tion included a "reluctan[ce] to enter the bramble bush of ascer-
taining and applying foreign law, ... common sense and judicial
self-restraint."'" However, these factors, more formally stated,
represent the factors considered when deciding whether or not to
issue a forum non conveniens dismissal; they do not provide any
assistance in determining whether subject matter jurisdiction ex-
ists. Similarly, the academic criticism of the transitory cause of ac-
tion theory focuses primarily on the considerations that inform a
forum non conveniens dismissal.' More recently, the Federal
Circuit in Mars recognized that subject matter jurisdiction can be
exercised under the diversity or alienage provisions, but it declined
to do so on forum non conveniens grounds, signaling that it appre-
ciates the distinction between the two.142 In any event, the few
cases that take the time to discuss the issue of subject matter juris-
diction seem to agree that federal courts have the statutory
authority to exercise diversity or alienage jurisdiction over intellec-
tual property claims arising under foreign law.
E. Alien Tort Statute Jurisdiction
In addition to failing to provide subject matter jurisdiction in di-
versity and alienage jurisdiction cases in which the complete diver-
sity or the amount in controversy requirements are not met, the
theories of subject matter jurisdiction discussed thus far also fail to
provide for subject matter jurisdiction in three scenarios involving
the adjudication of intellectual property rights under foreign law:
where foreign plaintiffs sue foreign defendants, where foreign
138. 785 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
139. Id. at 866.
140; Id. at 866-67.
141. See Note, supra note 61, at 364-69 (considering convenience to litigants and courts,
enforceability of judgments, and the difficulty of applying foreign law); Toraya, supra note
98, at 1182-85 (considering difficulty of applying foreign law).
142. See Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1375-76 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
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plaintiffs sue U.S. and foreign defendants, or where U.S. and for-
eign plaintiffs sue foreign defendants. Of course, the U.S. interest
in hearing such cases is fairly minimal, particularly where a foreign
plaintiff sues a foreign defendant under foreign intellectual prop-
erty law.43 Nonetheless, it is worth considering whether any stat-
ute would provide subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.
One avenue of subject matter jurisdiction that has remained
relatively dormant until recently'" is the Alien Tort Statute, which
provides federal district courts with original subject matter juris-
diction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."'45  Although this statute could not provide jurisdiction
over a suit brought by U.S. and foreign plaintiffs against a foreign
defendant, as the statute applies only to actions brought by an
alien, 146 it has the theoretical potential to provide subject matter
jurisdiction where foreign plaintiffs sue foreign defendants or
where foreign plaintiffs sue U.S. and foreign defendants. In prac-
tice, however, courts have almost never used the Alien Tort Stat-
ute to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.147
The use of the language "tort only" by the drafters of the Alien
Tort Statute was to distinguish commercial and contractual
wrongs-for which they did not want to provide jurisdiction-from
delictual wrongs, for which they did intend to provide jurisdic-
tion.' 48 This presents no problem for claims raised under certain
foreign intellectual property laws, as in at least some foreign na-
tions, a claim of infringement on an intellectual property right
143. Moreover, even assuming that subject matter jurisdiction could be exercised, it is
doubtful whether personal jurisdiction is proper. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987) (holding that personal jurisdiction is
lacking where plaintiff and defendant are from foreign nations, where the acts in question
took place outside of the U.S., and where foreign law would likely be applied).
144. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: In-
quiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 4-5 (1985). But see id.
("Prior to Filartiga, plaintiffs infrequently invoked the Alien Tort Statute (although not
quite as rarely as is sometimes assumed).") (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
146. See, e.g., Miner v. Begum, 8 F. Supp. 2d 643,644 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
147. See Randall, supra note 144, at 4-7.
148. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A
Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 479 & n.84 (1989) (distinguishing commercial and
delictual wrongs by describing the former as "all actions upon debt or promises" and the
latter as "all actions for trespasses, nuisances, assaults, defamatory words, and the like")
(quoting W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 673 (G. Chase
4th ed. 1923); Randall, supra note 144, at 28-31.
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sounds in tort.149 Moreover, to the extent that the "transitory tort"
theory for justifying diversity jurisdiction over foreign intellectual
property claims is sound,m it is sensible to consider a foreign in-
tellectual property claim to also be a "tort only" for the purposes
of the Alien Tort Statute. 5'
However, even assuming that the infringement of foreign intel-
lectual property fights is a "tort only" under the statute, the tort
alleged must be "committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."'' Given that only some nations have
as yet recognized intellectual property rights,M one cannot seri-
ously argue that the protection of intellectual property rights is a
"well-established, universally recognized norm[] of international
law,"a prerequisite for being classified as a "law of nations" under
the Alien Tort Statute. s Accordingly, subject matter jurisdiction
can-be brought under the Alien Tort Statute only if the infringing
action violates a treaty entered into by the United States. The
United States has entered into numerous multilateral treaties to
ensure that member nations establish laws designed to provide
minimal protection for intellectual property rights. 55 However,
none of these treaties are self-executing; they merely obligate the
signatory nations to create such laws within their countries.'5 The
only way in which a non-self-executing treaty can be violated is if a
signatory nation fails to pass implementing legislation into law, in
which case the "violation" is just that-a failure to pass imple-
menting legislation.'17 Because the intellectual property treaties to
149. See e.g., Jeffrey M. Dine, Authors' Moral Rights in Non-European Nations: Inter-
national Agreements, Economics, Mannu Bhandar4 and the Dead Sea Scrolls, 16 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 545, 571 (1995) (noting that under Israeli law, a claim for copyright infringement
sounds in tort).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 130-137.
151. Indeed, the landmark case involving the Alien Tort Statute, Filartiga v. Pena-lrala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), grounded jurisdiction partially on a transitory tort theory, see
id. at 885.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
153. See supra note 10; see also Ryan Beard, Reciprocity and Comity: Politically Ma-
nipulative Tools for Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy, 30
TEx. TECH L REv. 155,160 n.46 (1999) (citing THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN
ELLiOTr, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN U.S. TRADE POLICY 190 n.1 (1994)) (not-
ing that even such industrialized nations as Germany and Japan lack copyright protection
for computer software).
154. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
155. See supra note 9.
156. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
157. See Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?, 79 AM. J. INT'L L 92,
98-100 (1985) (concluding that "[tihere is no danger that non-self-executing treaties could
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which the United States is a party do not purport to regulate the
private behavior of individual citizens within the member nations,
an infringement action by one of those citizens does not violate
any of the treaties. Accordingly, the Alien Tort Statute will not
provide subject matter jurisdiction for a claim arising under for-
eign intellectual property laws.158
F. Subject Matter Jurisdiction versus Forum Non Conveniens
Those commentators opposed to finding subject matter jurisdic-
tion over foreign intellectual property claims contend that the af-
front to sovereign nations, the possibility that judgments will not
be enforced, and the expenditure of judicial time required to inves-
tigate the foreign laws offset any convenience to the parties of
having their claims adjudicated in a single action.159 Although
these concerns are certainly worthy of consideration, they confuse
the question whether subject matter jurisdiction exists with the
question whether subject matter jurisdiction should be exercised.
The-former question must be answered first when any case comes
before a court, while the latter and necessarily subsequent ques-
tion goes to whether the court should issue a forum non conveni-
ens dismissal, a discussion reserved for Part V of this Comment.
G. Summary
Although federal courts will not be able to exercise subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in all circumstances, they are able to exercise sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in many of the cases likely to come before
ever be included under section 1350"). Cf. Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572
F.2d 913, 916 (2d. Cir. 1978) (noting the lack of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute
for a wrongful death claim, which alleged violation of the Warsaw Convention, for the
death of plaintiff's wife in a plane crash as the Convention does not outlaw accidents, in-
jury, property loss or death, but merely requires compensation, and thus only a failure to
provide compensation would be a violation of the treaty).
158. Of course, this leaves open the possibility that a future U.S. treaty that is self-
executing could provide the basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute. In reality, however, it seems rather unlikely that the United States would
enter into a self-executing intellectual property treaty at any time in the near future, given
the Senate's pattern of conditioning its consent to treaty ratifications in general on the in-
clusion of declarations that the treaties are non-self-executing, in large part due to the
Senate's aversion to ceding control over domestic law to the international community. See
Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing"
and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515,515 (1991).
159. See Note, supra note 61, at 364-69; Toraya, supra note 98, at 1182-85.
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them under a variety of theories. 16° To the extent that a U.S. court
adjudicating the U.S. intellectual property rights of parties before
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their potential foreign
claims in a given situation, the issuance of an antisuit injunction
ordering those parties not to pursue their intellectual property
rights abroad would, naturally, be inappropriate. However, where
a U.S. court does have subject matter jurisdiction over the parties'
foreign intellectual property claims, the unwillingness of either
party to raise the foreign claims in the U.S. proceeding should
serve as a bar to that party subsequently litigating the claims in
foreign fora. Accordingly, in considering whether to issue such an
injunction, courts must first determine whether or not they would
have had subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign intellectual
property claim had the plaintiff raised it in the U.S. proceeding.
Ill. APPLICABILITY OF THE ACT OF STATE DOCrRINE TO
TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
Under the "judicially fashioned' ' 61 act of state doctrine, U.S.
federal courts "will not sit in judgment on the acts of the govern-
ment of another [country], done within its own territory."'1' The
act of state doctrine is applicable whenever "the relief sought or
the defense interposed ... require[s] a court in the United States
to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed
within its own territory."' Although one of the underlying pur-
poses of the act of state doctrine is to avoid an affront to the inde-
pendent sovereignty of a foreign sovereign,'6 its invocation is not
limited to foreign sovereigns or their officials; it can and often is
invoked in suits between entirely private parties.1t Although
some courts erroneously view the act of state inquiry as addressing
the question whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction over
160. For a summary of the findings of this Comment with respect to subject matter ju-
risdiction, see supra Table 1.
161. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 441 (1964) (White, J., dis-
senting).
162. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,252 (1897).
163. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405
(1990) (emphasis added).
164. See Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
165. See, eg., Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
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the case, 66 it is best understood as an inquiry that follows the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction inquiry.167
At first glance, a series of cases, beginning with Vanity Fair Mills
v. T. Eaton Co.,16 suggests that the act of state doctrine may bar a
U.S. court from adjudicating a claim arising under certain foreign
intellectual property laws. In Vanity Fair, the Second Circuit re-
fused to address a claim of infringement on a Canadian trademark
on act of state grounds. Under Canadian trademark law, the regis-
trant of a trademark is entitled to prevent others from using a
similar or confusing mark, unless the Canadian registration, which
is registered by a Canadian government official, is shown to be in-
valid.169 Although the Vanity Fair court did not use the phrase
"act of state," it cited to several bedrock act of state cases in sup-
port of its conclusion that "it is well-established that the courts of
one state will not determine the validity of the acts of a foreign
sovereign done within it borders.' 70 Accordingly, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
missal of the action arising under Canadian trademark law.171
In Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc.,t72 the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit laid the
166. See, e.g., Frink America, Inc. v. Champion Road Machinery Ltd., 961 F. Supp. 398,
404-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
167. See Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 309 (noting that the act of state doctrine is "not a surrender
or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an exercise of it"). The rationale for the act of state
doctrine has generally been unclear and has shifted over time. In Underhill, the case
which established the U.S. act of state doctrine, the Court suggested that the doctrine was
both compelled by international law, 168 U.S. at 252 ("Every sovereign State is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign State."), and that it was an outgrowth
of the sovereign immunity doctrine, id. at 253-54 (noting that the acts complained of in the
case were those of a military commander carrying on military operations). The Court
later described the doctrine as resting on "the highest considerations of international
comity." Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 303-04. Later, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, the
Court provided a new rationale for the doctrine, suggesting that it rested on separation of
powers concerns, and declaring that the judicial branch usually lacked the competence to
judge the acts of foreign sovereigns, a task for which the Court thought the executive
branch better suited. See 376 U.S. 398, 423-28 (1964). Finally, in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co.
v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400 (1990), the Supreme Court's last word on
the act of state doctrine, the Court treated the doctrine as a choice of law rule, and de-
scribed it as a "'principle of decision binding on federal and state courts alike."' Id. at 406
(alteration in original) (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427).
168. 234 F.2d 633 (1956).
169. See id. at 646.
170. See id. (citing, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909)).
171. See id. at 647-48.
172. 412 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1969).
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groundwork for extending the act of state doctrine to prevent U.S.
courts from adjudicating cases involving infringement on foreign
patent rights. After a Canadian corporation filed suit against a
Delaware corporation in U.S. court for a declaration that the de-
fendant's U.S. and Canadian patents were invalid, the Delaware
corporation brought its own infringement suit against the Cana-
dian corporation in a Canadian court on a Canadian patent
claim. 17 3 At the Canadian corporation's request, the U.S. district
court issued an antisuit injunction ordering the Delaware corpora-
tion to cease prosecution of its infringement action in Canada. 74
The Delaware corporation then urged the district court to dismiss
the Canadian patent issue on act of state grounds, but the district
court reserved judgment on the issue pending the outcome of the
U.S. patent infringement dispute.175 On appeal, the First Circuit
did not directly discuss the act of state doctrine, but invoked com-
ity to reverse the issuance of the antisuit injunction and to order
the lower court to abstain from proceeding with the suit "unless
the Canadian court elects to defer to the [U.S. court].' 76 Indeed,
only a few years later the court in Packard Instrument Co. v.
Beckman Instruments, Inc.17 cited both Canadian Filters and Van-
ity Fair as standing for a combination of abstention and comity
principles that compelled the court to dismiss actions based on
foreign patent laws.178 Nonetheless, because the courts issued the
Packard and Candian Filters decisions during a period 79 in which
the Supreme Court portrayed the act of state doctrine as an ab-
stention principle'8s grounded at least in part on notions of com-
ity,' these decisions are appropriately viewed as being grounded
in the act of state doctrine.18
173. See id. at 577-78.
174. See id. at 578.
175. See .
176. See id. at 579.
177. 346 F. Supp. 408 (N.D. M. 1972).
178. See id. at 410.
179. See supra note 167.
180. More recently, the Supreme Court has rejected the characterization of the act of
state doctrine as an abstention doctrine. See V.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental
Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990) ("The act of state doctrine is not some vague
doctrine of abstention but a 'principle of decision binding on federal and state courts
alike."') (alteration in original) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398,427 (1964)).
181. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,303-04 (1918).
182. Indeed, the Packard decision is often so described. See, eg., Kirios, supra note 65,
at 69 (noting that the Packard court "was not applying a new methodology to the problem
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Because none of these cases involved actions alleging copyright
infringement, a number of copyright scholars have examined the
underpinnings of these patent and trademark decisions and the act
of state doctrine to determine whether or not their reasoning
would extend to claims arising under foreign copyright laws. Pro-
fessor Nimmer argues that while the granting of a patent or trade-
mark right in most nations requires an affirmative act by a gov-
ernment official, almost no country requires that any
"administrative formalities" be satisfied to create or to perfect a
copyright."as Professor Kirios agrees that the act of state doctrine:
[I]s applicable whenever exclusive rights are con-
ferred by the act of a sovereign, the act usually be-
ing an administrative hearing or examination ... in
patent and trademark grants, [but that] [s]ince the
adoption of the [Universal Copyright Convention],
... the existence of copyright protection in [a] signa-
tory country is not dependent on any sovereign act,
but comes into being on the commission of certain
acts by the author or proprietor.184
Accordingly, he concludes that if a court rules on the existence or
lack thereof of a foreign copyright, the court "would not be pass-
ing on the public acts of a state" but would rather be questioning
the validity of acts done by the individual author.185
Following the publication of these arguments in Professor Nim-
mer's treatise, a number of courts have held that the act of state
doctrine does not bar U.S. courts from adjudicating claims arising
under foreign copyright law. For example, in London Film Pro-
ductions Ltd. v. Intercontinental Communications, Inc.,186 the court,
in considering whether it could adjudicate claims arising under
Chilean law, cited to Professor Nimmer's treatise and concluded
that "[t]he British films at issue here received copyright protection
in Great Britain simply by virtue of publication there[, and] Chile's
adherence to the Berne Convention in 1970 automatically con-
of multinational infringements but was rearticulating the act of state and forum non con-
veniens considerations discussed in Vanity Fair").
183. NIMMER, supra note 134, at § 17.03.
184. Kirios, supra note 65, at 67 & n.67 (noting that under the Universal Copyright
Convention, an author ensures copyright protection in signatory nations by placing the
"©" symbol followed by his name and the first date of publication on all copies of his
copyrighted work). See also NIMMER, supra note 134, § 17.03 at n.9 (noting "that adminis-
trative formalities are barred in all nations that adhere to the Berne Convention").
185. Kirios, supra note 65, at 67.
186. 580 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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ferred copyright protection on these films in Chile. Therefore, no
'act of state' is called into question here."' 7 Similarly, the court in
Frink America, Inc. v. Champion Road Machinery Ltd.18 cited
both Professor Nimmer's treatise and London Film in support of
its conclusion that it could adjudicate a claim arising under Cana-
dian copyright law.189 Accordingly, even if one assumes arguendo
that the question whether the act of state doctrine bars U.S. courts
from adjudicating claims arising under foreign patent and trade-
mark laws is a settled one, it is well-accepted that the bar does not
extend to claims arising under foreign copyright law.
However, the question remains whether the act of state doctrine
does or should prevent a U.S. court from adjudicating a claim
arising under foreign patent laws. In Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp.,190 an antitrust case in which a U.S. manufac-
turer of floor covering alleged that another U.S. manufacturer of
floor covering fraudulently secured foreign patents, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the defen-
dant's invocation of the act of state doctrine to prevent the court
from examining the validity of the patents issued by the foreign
governments.1 91 The Mannington Mills court stressed that in those
cases in which the courts have traditionally invoked the act of state
doctrine, "the crucial acts occurred as a result of a considered pol-
icy determination by a government to give effect to its political and
public interests[,] matters that would have significant impact on
American foreign relations."192 In contrast, the court concluded
that the grant of a patent for floor coverings is merely a "ministe-
rial activity" and thus "not the type of sovereign activity that
would be of substantial concern to the executive branch in its con-
duct of international affairs." 193
The difference between Mannington Mills and older cases such
as Vanity Fair represents a shift in the substance of the act of state
doctrine over this century. In recent years, courts have moved
away from the traditional formulation of the act of state doctrine,
which rigidly interpreted the words "act of state," and toward an
187 . Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
188. 961 F. Supp. 398 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
189. See id. at 404-05. The court erroneously viewed this as a determination of whether
it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case rather than a determination of whether
the act of state doctrine applies. See id.
190. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
19L See id. at 1290,1292-94.
192. Id at 1294 (citation omitted).
193. Id.
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approach that focuses on separation of powers concerns in the car-
rying out of foreign policy.194 Indeed, subsequent cases both
within and outside the field of transnational intellectual property
litigation have cited the Mannington Mills court's application of
the act of state doctrine with approval. In Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v.
Congeleum Corp.,195 a district court explained that resolving a dis-
pute over foreign patent rights does not implicate the act of state
doctrine because the court is not challenging the foreign govern-
ment's power to grant the patent, but rather is inquiring into
whether the defendant "failed to comply with the laws of foreign
countries,' 1 96 an understanding of the act of state doctrine consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's most recent characterization of the
doctrine as a choice of law rule.197 More generally, however, the
Forbo-Giubasco court read Mannington Mills as standing for the
proposition that the act of state doctrine does not apply in situa-
tions in which the court action would not interfere with the U.S.
government's foreign affairs conduct. 98 Moreover, another court
has restated the Mannington Mills principle as "requir[ing] that a
defendant come forward with proof that adjudication of a plain-
tiff's claim poses a demonstrable, not a speculative, threat to the
conduct of foreign relations by the political branches of the United
States government."'"
One could, as Professors Nimmer and Kirios have, distinguish
between foreign copyright claims on the one hand and foreign pat-
ent and trademark claims on the other, applying the act of state
doctrine to bar the latter but not the former.2°' However, such a
formalistic application of the doctrine would be inconsistent with
any of the modern rationales for its existence. Rather, one should
parse the cases by date, and conclude that the evolution of the act
of state doctrine during this century means that it simply cannot be
invoked in transnational intellectual property disputes among pri-
194. See Toraya, supra note 98, at 1180. See also W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,404 (1990) (noting that the act of state doctrine has
been viewed as "a consequence of domestic separation of powers").
195. 516 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
196. Id. at 1217.
197. See Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406.
198. See Forbo-Giubasco, 516 F. Supp. at 1217.
199. See Environmental Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1061
(3d Cir. 1988), af-fd 493 U.S. 400 (1990). See also Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694
F.2d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that Mannington Mills did not establish a ministerial
exception but rather a test that looks into the "effect or lack of effect upon American for-
eign relations").
200. See supra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
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vate parties. So interpreted, the act of state doctrine would not
prevent U.S. courts from exercising jurisdiction over foreign intel-
lectual property claims.
IV. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN
TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
In domestic litigation in U.S. courts, when a party has received a
final judgment on the merits of his cause of action, that party, and
those in privity with him, are generally barred under the doctrine
of res judicata from relitigating issues that were or could have been
raised in the first action2 1° Where a subsequent action arises from
the same "transaction or occurrence" as a prior federal action, pre-
clusive effect must be given to the prior federal action m The
"transaction or occurrence test" is in essence the same as the test
of the same name used to determine whether counterclaims are
compulsory or permissive under the federal joinder rules.213 The
Supreme Court has held that under this test, "'[t]ransaction' is a
word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many oc-
currences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their
connection as upon their logical relationship."' ' And some cir-
cuits have equated it with the "common nucleus of operative fact"
test for supplemental jurisdiction. 05
Where a state court issues a final judgment, and a subsequent
action is brought in a federal court, the federal court must deter-
mine the preclusive effect of the state judgment by looking to state
law.20 Prior judgments arising from foreign courts, however, stand
on rather a different footing. In Hilton v. Guyot, 7 the Supreme
201. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,94 (1980).
202. See e.g., Manego v. Orleans Bd. of Trade, 773 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985).
203. See 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4407, at 62 (1981).
204. Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926).
205. Compare Olmstead v. Amoco Oil Co., 725 F.2d 627, 632 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The
[res judicata] bar extends not only to the precise legal theory presented in the previous
litigation, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the same 'operative nucleus of
fact."') (citation omitted), and Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261, 1263 (1st Cir. 1974)
("Res judicata, when the suit is between the same parties and concerns the same operative
nucleus of fact,... bars issues even if unlitigated."), with United Mine Workers of Amer-
ica v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that supplemental jurisdiction is proper
only when the federal and non-federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact").
206. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380
(1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738).
207. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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Court relied on principles of international comity to hold that fed-
eral courts should enforce foreign judgments only where the for-
eign judgment followed a full, fair and impartial trial in which due
notice was given to the defendant and in which the judgment was
not fraudulently obtained." 8 In addition, the Hilton court held
that federal courts should not extend this comity to nations that do
not reciprocate by enforcing U.S. judgments under similar circum-
stances.m9 In sum, although a U.S. court may give preclusive effect
to a foreign judgment, it need not do so.
If a party is unable to assert a claim because the forum lacks
subject matter jurisdiction or "jurisdictional competence," res ju-
dicata is generally inapplicable.210  Therefore, the questions
whether a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a given
foreign intellectual property claim and whether the act of state
doctrine bars the court from adjudicating that claim are critical in
determining whether or not the court should issue an antisuit in-
junction to prevent a party that has already litigated a U.S. intel-
lectual property claim in a U.S. court from proceeding with a claim
against the same party in a foreign forum. It would be unfair for a
U.S. court to enjoin a party from bringing a claim elsewhere if the
U.S. court would not or could not adjudicate the matter. On the
other hand, if the U.S. court could and would have considered any
intellectual property claims arising under foreign laws, and if the
U.S. judgment would have had a preclusive effect on litigating the
foreign intellectual property claim in another U.S. court, pre-
venting the parties from relitigating the case elsewhere would be
reasonable. Similarly, questions about the ability and willingness
of foreign tribunals to adjudicate intellectual property claims aris-
ing under U.S. law are critical to a U.S. court's inquiry into
208. See id. at 162-209.
209. See id. at 210-28.
210. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(c) (1982) (noting
that a "jurisdictional competence" exception to the general rule against splitting a cause of
action applies if plaintiff was unable to assert a particular claim or theory in the original
case "because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction" of the court). But see
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985) ("[A]
state court judgment may in some circumstances have preclusive effect in a subsequent
action within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.") (emphasis added).
211. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Altai, Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc.,
118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998) (No. 97-1417) (contending that "when claims of worldwide copy-
right infringement are submitted to a United States federal court for adjudication and a
final judgment is entered under the laws of the United States, ... all claims, including
those that could have been brought under foreign law, are merged into the final judg-
ment").
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whether it should dismiss a subsequent claim grounded in U.S. in-
tellectual property law.2n In other words, this information aids a
U.S. court in determining whether preclusive effect should be
given to a foreign judgment.
Moreover, even where the doctrine of res judicata is inapplica-
ble to bar a U.S. court from litigating a given claim, courts can use
the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of an is-
sue decided in the prior litigation by the same party or someone in
privity with him.2 Thus, where a party has previously litigated a
claim arising under foreign intellectual property law in a foreign
forum, and subsequently brings an action in a U.S. court arising
under U.S. intellectual property law, the doctrine of res judicata
should not bar the U.S. action if the foreign court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the claim arising under U.S. law. None-
theless, the party should be precluded from relitigating issues pre-
viously decided in the foreign action, provided that the Hilton cri-
teria are satisfied. Similarly, where a party has previously litigated
U.S. intellectual property claims in a U.S. court, and subsequently
brifigs an action in a foreign court arising under foreign intellectual
property laws, no principled reason exists why a foreign court can-
not enjoin the party from relitigating issues decided in the U.S. ac-
tion.
Under this approach, once a plaintiff selects a forum in which to
bring suit, she must raise all claims that she could bring in that fo-
rum under both U.S. and foreign law or risk waiving such claims.
However, fundamental fairness dictates that preclusion would not
apply where the claims do not arise from the same transaction or
series of transactions, or where the court in which the first suit was
brought lacked subject matter jurisdiction over both the U.S. and
the foreign claims.
Notwithstanding this doctrinal background, a court has yet to
use the doctrine of res judicata either to dismiss an action in a U.S.
court under U.S. intellectual property laws where the party has
previously litigated foreign intellectual property rights in a foreign
court, or to enjoin a party from pursuing a foreign intellectual
property claim in a foreign forum where the party has litigated a
U.S. intellectual property right in a U.S. forum. The few courts
212. A review of the justiciability doctrines of nations other than the United States is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
213. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-30
(1971).
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that have considered the matter have either contained fact pat-
terns that made res judicata inappropriate, or have simply failed to
give a principled justification for why res judicata should not apply.
In Leo Feist, Inc. v. Debmar Publishing Co., 14 the plaintiff
brought suit against several defendants in a U.S. court under U.S.
copyright laws.215 The defendants argued that res judicata should
serve as a bar to the plaintiffs suit because the plaintiff had previ-
ously brought and lost an action against the same defendants in a
British court under English copyright law involving the same pro-
tected intellectual property.216 In declining to apply res judicata,
the Leo Feist court offered this brief explanation: "res judicata
cannot be applied since this suit is brought under the United States
statute for infringements which occurred in the United States,
whereas the English suit was brought under the English statute for
different infringements which occurred in England. '217 Perhaps by
this statement the court meant that the two claims did not derive
from the same "transaction or occurrence" in that the distribution
of the infringing materials took place in separate locations and
thus represented separate occurrences. If so, this is a much stricter
construction of the "transaction or occurrence" test than courts
generally give to it.218 Moreover, if the case presented a problem
of "jurisdictional competence," in that the British court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the U.S. claim, the court
made no mention of it in its opinion. Finally, there was no ques-
tion that the parties in the English action were in privity with the
parties in the U.S. action. 2 9 Accordingly, if the Leo Feist court
had a good reason for not applying res judicata, it failed to articu-
late that reason in its opinion.
In Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar,220 Vas-Cath and others brought
suit against Mahurkar in a U.S. court under U.S. patent laws.221
Both a U.S. and a Canadian patent covered the invention in ques-
tion, and a Canadian court had in prior litigation ruled in Ma-
214. 232 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
215. See id. at 623.
216. See id.
217. Id at 623-24. Nonetheless, the court did apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
See id. at 624; infra text accompanying notes 257-263.
218. See supra text accompanying note 204.
219. See Leo Feist, 232 F. Supp. at 623.
220. 745 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. IIl. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. 1 ir.
1991).
221. See id. at 520.
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hurkar's favor under Canadian patent laws.m Accordingly, Ma-
hurkar asked the U.S. court to give res judicata effect to the Cana-
dian court's judgment, as it covered the exact same invention.2z1
The court held that res judicata could not apply because the claims
in the two actions were different: one under the Canadian patent
and the other under the U.S. patent0 4 The court concluded that
"claim preclusion applies only to a claim that was or could have
been prosecuted in the first action," and that "Mahurkar ... could
not have contended in the Canadian actioni] that Vas-Cath's
products infringed the U.S. [] patent."' ' 5 Because the Vas-Cath
court correctly pointed out that Canadian courts lack subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to adjudicate claims arising under U.S. intellectual
property laws, the Vas-Cath court properly applied the "jurisdic-
tion competence" exception to res judicata. Accordingly, Vas-
Cath does not stand for the proposition that res judicata can never
apply in transnational intellectual property litigation.
Most recently, the issue of res judicata in transnational intellec-
tual property litigation arose in Computer Associates International,
Inc. v. Alta4 Inc.,' a copyright infringement dispute between two
U.S. computer software companies m In 1988, Computer Associ-
ates brought suit against Altai in U.S. court, alleging that Altai's
OSCAR 3.4 and OSCAR 3.5 computer programs violated Com-
puter Associates' U.S. copyright.229 In 1990, while the U.S. suit
was still pending, Computer Associates brought suit against Altai
and its French distributor in France, alleging that Altai's OSCAR
3.5 -computer program violated Computer Associates' French
copyright. 3 In 1991, the district court ruled that Altai's OSCAR
3.4 program infringed on Computer Associates' copyright, but that
222. See id. at 524-25.
223. See it. at 525.
224. See it.
225. Id.
226. See e.g., Coca-Cola Ltd. v. Pardhan [1997] 77 C.P.R.3d 501, 511 (noting that it is
beyond the jurisdiction of a Canadian court to adjudicate claims of trademark infringe-
ment arising under the laws of foreign nations); R.W. Blacktop Ltd. v. Artec Equipment
Co. [1991] 39 C.P.R.3d 432, 434 (noting that plaintiff conceded that the court lacks juris-
diction to hear and decide claims relating to U.S. patents); Rohm & Haas Co. v. NL Chem
Canada Inc. [1989] 28 C.P.R.3d 504,507 (noting that Canadian courts cannot grant injunc-
tions or award damages for infringement of U.S. patents).
227. 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998).
228. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Altai, Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l. Inc..
118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998) (No. 97-1417).
229. See Altai, 126 F.3d at 367.
230. See id. at 367-68.
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its OSCAR 3.5 program did not; the Court of Appeals affirmed.231
After several years of stays, trial in France began late in 1994.?
At the time the French trial began, Altai had a motion pending in
the U.S. district court to enjoin Computer Associates from pro-
ceeding with the French action.233 The French court refused to
give preclusive effect to the U.S. adjudication, but it nonetheless
ruled that Altai's OSCAR 3.5 program did not infringe on Com-
puter Associates' French copyright. 2 Altai withdrew its motion
for an antisuit injunction, but renewed it once it learned that
Computer Associates had filed an appeal in France.35 Altai con-
tended that under the doctrine of res judicata, Computer Associ-
ates' U.S. action precluded it from pursuing the French action be-
cause it could have raised the French actions in the U.S.
proceedings. 6 The trial court refused to give res judicata effect to
the U.S. proceeding, 237 and on appeal, the Second Circuit cited two
reasons for why res judicata would not apply: because the conduct
at issue in the French action occurred after Computer Associates
initiated the U.S. action, and because the district court lacked per-
sonal jurisdiction over Altal's French distributor, a principal party
in the French action.3 s Both of these defects are established ex-
ceptions to the application of res judicata in non-intellectual prop-
erty actions.29 Accordingly, the court did not say that res judicata
could not apply where transnational intellectual property rights
were being litigated, but rather said that it would not apply under
the particular circumstances present in the case.
Another line of cases seems at first glance to provide implicit
support for the proposition that foreign judgments regarding for-
eign trademark rights can have no preclusive effect whatsoever on
231. See id. at 367.
232. See id. at 368.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 368-69.
237. See Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 48, 51-53 (E.D.N.Y.
1996), af'fd, 126 F.3d 365 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998).
238. See Altai, 126 F.3d at 369-71.
239. See, e.g., id. at 370 (citing SEC v. First Jersey Sec., 101 F.3d 1450, 1464 (2d Cir.
1996); Los Angeles Branch NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 750 F.2d 731, 739
(9th Cir. 1984)) (holding that res judicata does not apply to new rights acquired during an
actioii which might have been but which were not litigated); id. (quoting Burgos v. Hop-
kins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278 (2d
Cir. 1986))) (noting that res judicata does not apply where "'the initial forum did not have
the power to award the full measure of relief sought in the later litigation"').
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a U.S. court's adjudication of U.S. trademark rights24'° In rejecting
efforts by plaintiffs to introduce evidence of foreign adjudications
involving foreign intellectual property rights, these courts did not
provide any independent reasoning; rather, they quoted the fol-
lowing passage from Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.:241 "[W]hen
trademark rights within the United States are being litigated in an
American court, the decisions of foreign courts concerning the re-
spective trademark rights of the parties are irrelevant and inadmis-
sible." 2  Interestingly, the Vanity Fair court also did not provide
any independent support for this proposition, but instead cited to
the Second Circuit's opinion in George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cos-
metic Co. 243 At issue in Luft was a trial court order enjoining the
defendants from using the disputed trademark anywhere in the
world, and ordering payment of damages based on worldwide us-
age of the trademark 2 " At trial, the defendants offered certified
copies of foreign proceedings in which the foreign tribunals had
held that the defendants had the legal right within those countries
to use the trademark at issue.2 45 The district court refused to admit
that evidence, citing City of Carlsbad v. Kutnow. 46 On appeal,
however, the Second Circuit explained that in Carlsbad, the prob-
lem was that the defendants were introducing a British decision
regarding the defendants' British trademark rights to prove that
the-defendants had established the right to use the trademark in
the United States. 47 Indeed, the Second Circuit in Luft distin-
guished Carlsbad from the case before it: "Here the purpose of of-
fering the foreign registrations was not to establish the privilege of
240. See eg., E. Remy Martin & Co. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imports, Inc., 756 F.2d 1525,
1531-32 (11th Cir. 1985); Fuji Photo Film Co., Inc. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha,
754 F.2d 591, 599-600 (5th Cir. 1985); Calzaturifieio Rangoni v. United States Shoe Corp.,
868 F. Supp. 1414, 1418 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Tb. Steinweg Nachf.
v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707,719 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd as modified, 523 F.2d 1331
(2d Cir. 1975).
241. 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
242- Id. at 639.
243. Id. (citing George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir.
1944)).
244. See Luft, 142 F.2d at 539-40.
245. See icL at 539.
246. See id. (citing City of Carlsbad v. Kutnow, 68 F. 794 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that evi-
dence of a decision by a British court granting the defendants the right to use the disputed
trademark was inadmissible since the British decision had no effect outside of that juris-
diction), afj'd 71 F. 167 (2d. Cir. 1895), which held that evidence of a decision by a British
court granting the defendants the right to use the disputed trademark was inadmissible
since the British decision had no effect outside of that jurisdiction).
247. See id
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using the [trademark] in the United States but to prove that the
defendants might lawfully use it within the foreign country which
granted the registration."24 Thus, Carlsbad had nothing to do with
claim preclusion: the defendants did not offer the evidence of the
foreign proceedings to support the argument that the plaintiffs
were barred from bringing a claim that they could have brought in
a prior foreign proceeding. Rather, the defendants offered the
foreign judgments as conclusive evidence that they had established
a U.S. trademark right.249 In Luft, the Second Circuit concluded
that "clearly the English law could not confer a privilege to do
something in this country which our courts were bound to recog-
nize." Of course, giving preclusive effect to a foreign judgment
is not allowing a foreign law to confer a privilege to do something
on U.S. soil. Rather, it means that, if the plaintiff chose to adjudi-
cate his claims of worldwide trademark infringement in a foreign
forum, and either had that court adjudicate, inter alia, his claim of
U.S. trademark infringement under U.S. law, or failed to raise the
U.S. claim at all, then the U.S. court would give preclusive effect to
the foreign judgment and deny the plaintiff the opportunity to reli-
tigate the claim. This clearly stands on a different footing than a
claim that the right to use a trademark in a foreign nation under
foreign law has extraterritorial reach that entitles one to use that
same trademark in the United States. Thus, the strongly-worded
quote in Vanity Fair is based on that court's failure to understand
both the holding in Carlsbad and the Luft court's explanation of
that holding.
Although none of the reported cases has applied the doctrine of
res judicata in the context of transnational intellectual property
disputes, none of the cases seems to bar its application under the
proper circumstances. Moreover, U.S. courts have applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude parties from re-litigating
issues previously decided in foreign proceedings.251  Indeed, in
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. Id. (citations omitted).
251. See, e.g., Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d 1190, 1196
(2d Cir. 1971) ("Even though the precise issue there being litigated was trademark rights
in West Germany, collateral estoppel would very likely apply ... since ... 'both causes of
action arose out of the same subject matter,' ... and the East German enterprise had both
the opportunity and the incentive to litigate the case fully.") (citations omitted); Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (noting that
West German decisions estop defendants from questioning issues decided in the West
German court), affd as modified, 433 F.2d 686 (1970).
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Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar,-2 a case involving a transnational pat-
ent dispute, the court's rationale for applying collateral estoppel
describes the theme of this Comment:
Conservation of resources is the principal objective
of the law of preclusion, and that is a vital objective
when costs are high, the more so when similar pat-
ents have been secured in many of the industrial
countries. Patent litigation should not be allowed to
become a war of attrition, in which after the conclu-
sion of one battle parties move on to another and
duplicate the engagementP3
In Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp.,2M Judge Weinstein refused to apply
collateral estoppel to findings previously made by a British court
on the grounds that "the Federal Circuit's reluctance to give col-
lateral estoppel effect to foreign judgments would seem to apply
here to foreign findings of fact insofar as those findings involve
mixed questions of fact and foreign law." 55 But in Vas-Cath,
Judge Easterbrook disputed Judge Weinstein's reading of the
Federal Circuit's precedents and concluded that "[i]f a foreign
court renders judgment on a question of fact with significance in
each system of law, there is no reason not to take over that deci-
sion." 6 Indeed, that situation occurred in Leo Feist, Inc. v. Deb-
mar Publishing Co.,' a transnational copyright dispute in which a
prior judgment had been made in a British court under English
law. 8 The Leo Feist court noted that under the copyright laws of
both England and the United States, proof of either conscious or
subconscious copying is requiredY5 9 The court noted that the
British court had found no proof of copying,- cited to Hilton v.
Guyot - and concluded that there was "no reason why the courts
of this country in a case such as [this] should refuse to recognize
252. 745 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. IIl. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
253. Id. at 525.
254. 729 F. Supp. 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
255. IM at 239.
256. Vas-Cath, 745 F. Supp. at 526.
257. 232 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
258: See id. at 623.
259. See id. at 624.
260. See id.
261. Seeid
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the fact finding of an English court."262 Although courts occasion-
ally have not applied collateral estoppel to foreign judgments in-
volving intellectual property rights, such cases involved issues that
were not sufficiently "identical" for the court to be sure that the
issue before the U.S. court had already been previously decided by
the foreign court.263
To summarize, U.S. courts have doctrinal authority to apply the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to prevent parties
from making their transnational intellectual property disputes "a
war of attrition."264 To date, they have shown some willingness to
apply collateral estoppel, and although they have yet to invoke res
judicata to bar suits in situations in which parties could have but
chose not to raise all of their U.S. and foreign intellectual property
claims in a single proceeding, none of the decisions foreclose
courts from exercising this option.
Accordingly, when a U.S. court is asked to adjudicate a claim
arising under the U.S. intellectual property laws subsequent to a
suit in a foreign court under foreign intellectual property laws, the
court should first determine whether the Hilton factors-a full, fair
and impartial trial, proper notice, absence of fraud, and reciproc-
ity-are satisfied. If they are not satisfied, the U.S. court should
adjudicate the claim, and it should not give collateral estoppel ef-
fect to any issues litigated in the foreign proceeding.
If the Hilton factors are satisfied, the U.S. court should next de-
termine whether the two actions arise from the same "transaction
or occurrence." If they do not, the U.S. court should adjudicate
the U.S. claim, although to the extent that the parties in the U.S.
action are in privity with those in the foreign action, collateral es-
toppel should be applied to prevent the parties from relitigating
issues decided in the prior proceeding. If the two actions do arise
from the same "transaction or occurrence," the U.S. court should
next determine whether the foreign court possessed subject matter
jurisdiction to adjudicate the U.S. claim.265 If it did not, then the
262. Id. The Leo Feist court applied collateral estoppel not because the judgment was
issued by a British court, but rather because the courts of England meet the conditions set
forth in Hilton v. Guyot. See id.; see also text accompanying notes 207-09.
263. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 126 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998).
264. Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 745 F. Supp. 517,525 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
265. Under a stricter version of this theory, the inquiry would be whether either the
U.S. or the foreign forum had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate both claims. If, for
instance, the U.S. court had jurisdiction to hear both claims and the foreign court only had
jurisdiction to hear the foreign claim, and if the plaintiff chose to bring his first suit in the
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U.S. court should adjudicate the U.S. claim, but should also apply
collateral estoppel where appropriate. If the foreign court had
subject matter jurisdiction over the U.S. claim, the U.S. court
should refuse to hear the case on res judicata grounds.
A similar inquiry-absent a Hilton analysis of the U.S. court-
should take place when a plaintiff has litigated a claim in a U.S.
court, and the defendant asks the court to enjoin the plaintiff from
proceeding in a foreign forum on a foreign cause of action. If the
two actions do not arise from the same "transaction or occur-
rence," then the U.S. court should not enjoin the parties from liti-
gating the claim in the foreign forum, but should enjoin them from
litigating issues to the extent that collateral estoppel would be ap-
propriate. If the two actions do arise from the same "transaction
or occurrence," the U.S. court should determine whether it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign claim. If it did not,
then it should not enjoin the parties from litigating the claim in the
foreign forum, but should enjoin them from litigating issues to the
extent that collateral estoppel would be appropriate. Finally, if the
U.S. court had subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign claim, it
should enjoin the parties from litigating in the foreign forum.
V. FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN TRANSNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY DISPUTES
In Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, the Supreme Court deline-
ated the criteria that federal courts should consider when deciding
whether to issue forum non conveniens dismissals in cases over
which a federal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate. The Court
identified two relevant factors: the private interest of the parties to
the suit and the public interest.27 The private interest factors con-
sist of the ease of access to evidence and witnesses; the enforce-
ability of the judgment; whether the plaintiff has sought to vex,
harass or oppress the defendant; and any other practical problems
that bear on the ease, expediency, and expense of litigating the
foreign court, his subsequent suit would be barred. See Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985) ("[A] state court judgment may in some
circumstances have preclusive effect in a subsequent action within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts.") (emphasis added). Application of the theory in such a strict
manner seems unwise, however, as it effectively denies the plaintiff of any real "choice" of
forum in which to adjudicate his claims.
266. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
267. See id. at 508.
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dispute.2" Public interest factors include the administrative diffi-
culties due to court congestion; the burden of jury duty on mem-
bers of a community that lacks a significant relation to the dispute;
interest in having localized controversies adjudicated locally; in-
terest in having diversity cases tried in a forum familiar with the
law that governs the dispute; and the avoidance of unnecessary
problems involving conflicts of law.269 Although the Court held
that application of the forum non conveniens doctrine was com-
mitted to the discretion of trial court judges,210 the Court stressed
that courts should apply the doctrine only if an adequate alterna-
tive forum existed in which the plaintiff could bring his claims
against the defendant. 1 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held
that although the difficulty of applying foreign law may be a con-
sideration in the forum non conveniens analysis, it is not by itself
sufficient to warrant a dismissal. 2
In Mars, Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux,273 the Federal
Circuit found neither the requisite elements of unfair competition
nor supplemental jurisdiction in a claim brought under Japanese
patent law,274 and issued a "preemptive" forum non conveniens
holding in the event that the plaintiff chose to amend his pleadings
to include a claim of diversity jurisdiction.2 5 The Mars court sug-
gested that the difficulty of applying Japanese procedural and sub-
stantive law combined with "comity" concerns276 would support a
forum non conveniens dismissal of the foreign cause of action.277
However, the Mars court made a number of errors in its forum
non conveniens analysis. First, the Mars court only considered the
public interest factors when it made its "prediction" of how it
would decide the forum non conveniens question, making no men-
tion of the private interest factors. 8 Indeed, had the Mars court
268. See id.
269. See id. at 508-09.
270. See id. at 508.
271. See id. at 506-07.
272. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,260 n.29 (1981).
273. 24 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
274. See supra notes 76-81, 101-05 and accompanying text.
275. See Mars, 24 F.3d at 1375-76.
276. It is unclear exactly what the Mars court meant by "comity" concerns, as "comity"
per se is not among the public interest factors mentioned by the Supreme Court in Gulf
Oil. Perhaps it was referring to the interest in having localized controversies adjudicated
locally; if not, the Mars court may have erred in making its decision based solely on the
difficulty of applying foreign law. See supra text accompanying note 272.
277. See Mars, 24 F.3d at 1376.
278. See id.
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considered the private interest factors, its conclusion would very
likely have differed. The effect of the Mars decision was to split
the plaintiffs case into two separate actions: one brought in the
United States under U.S. law, and the other brought in Japan un-
der Japanese law. Given that the defendant had to defend the
U.S. action in the United States, the incremental private burden on
the defendant of defending against the Japanese action would
clearly be minimal. The defendant's effort was little more than an
effort to split the suit into multiple parts tried in multiple nations,
designed to "complicate the suit, delay it, and render it more ex-
pensive" for the plaintiff,2 9 which clearly bears on the ease, expe-
diency, and expense of litigating the dispute, and thus has a sub-
stantial effect on the plaintiff's private interests.3 Moreover, the
Mars court failed to confirm the existence of an adequate alterna-
tive forum in which the plaintiff could bring the suit, and failed to
compare the U.S. forum with the alternative forum based on all
the public and private interest factors, as required by Gulf Oil. 28
279. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 492
(2d Cir. 1998) ("[I]t seems rather more likely that Disney's motion seeks to split the suit
into 18 parts in 18 nations, complicate the suit, delay it, and render it more expensive.").
280. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,508 (1947).
281. See supra notes 264-71 and accompanying text. Similarly, in ITSI T. V. Pro&, Inc
v. California Authority of Racing Fairs, 785 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Cal. 1992). the court held
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a Mexican copyright claim, notwithstanding
the fact that the parties were diverse. See id at 866-67; see also itt at 856-57 (noting that
the plaintiff was an Illinois corporation and the defendant was a Mexican corporation). In
the alternative, the court held that it would dismiss the action on forum non conveniens
grounds because the need to apply Mexican law would work a hardship on the court. See
id at 867 n.20. However, the ITSI T. V. court's forum non conveniens analysis is seriously
flawed in several respects. First, the court cites 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as giving it the author-
ity to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds. See id However, § 1404(a) is
a codification of the forum non conveniens doctrine for transfers among federal district
courts, and does not apply where the action is being dismissed in favor of a foreign forum.
See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
296-97 (3d ed. 1996). Importantly, although the factors to be considered in a forum non
conveniens dismissal are similar to those to be considered in a § 1404(a) transfer, § 1404(a)
provides district courts with far more discretion to grant transfers and upon a much lesser
showing of inconvenience than is required under the forum non conveniens analysis. See
Modem Computer Corp. v. Ma, 862 F. Supp. 938,948 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29,32 (1955)). Indeed, among the factors to be considered in the §
1404(a) analysis is "the desirability of having the case tried by the forum familiar with the
substantive law to be applied." See id (citations omitted). It is perhaps this first error
which led the ITSI T.V. court to commit a far more serious error in its forum non conveni-
ens analysis: the only ground given by the court in favor of dismissal is the hardship on the
court of applying Mexican law, with which it is unfamiliar. See ITSI T.V., 785 F. Supp. at
867 n.20. However, this goes directly against the Supreme Court's admonition that a court
cannot base a forum non conveniens dismissal solely on the difficulty that would result
from applying foreign law. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,260 n.29 (1981).
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In expressing a willingness to dismiss the foreign claim on forum
non conveniens grounds while retaining jurisdiction over the U.S.
claim, the Mars court acted in a manner that appears consistent
with the older cases involving transnational intellectual property
disputes, such as Vanity Fair and Packard.2 Unlike the Mars
court, however, the Vanity Fair court at least considered the pri-
vate factors, and noted that because most of the witnesses and
proof were located in the foreign nation and because a Canadian
court might not enforce the U.S. judgment, a forum non conveni-
ens dismissal was warranted.28  Moreover, the courts decided
these cases on act of state rather than forum non conveniens
grounds. The Vanity Fair court's discussion of the private interest
factors was merely an alternative holding to its act of state hold-
ing.' Additionally, the Packard court noted that although
grounds for forum non conveniens dismissal were lacking,2 the
act of state grounds for dismissal discussed in Vanity Fair, which
were listed under the heading "Forum Non Conveniens," were
nonetheless applicable.286 Reliance on these cases is misplaced due
to the inapplicability of the act of state doctrine to foreign intellec-
tual property claims2l7 and because the courts did not actually de-
cide them on forum non conveniens grounds.
Finally, the ITSI T.V. court failed to confirm the existence of an adequate alternative fo-
rum in which the plaintiff could bring the suit, and failed to compare the U.S. forum with
the alternative forum based on all the public and private interest factors, as required by
Gulf Oil. See supra notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645-48 (2d Cir. 1956)
(retaining jurisdiction over claim arising under U.S. trademark law, but dismissing claim
arising under Canadian trademark law); Packard Instrument Co. v. Beckman Instruments,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 408, 409-11 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (retaining jurisdiction over claim arising un-
der U.S. patent law but dismissing claims arising under Canadian, Swedish, French, Swiss,
Italian, Japanese, West German, British, and Israeli law).
283. See Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 646 & n.18, 647 & n.20, 648.
284. See id. at 646-47 ("We are convinced that the balance of convenience is strongly in
favor of defendant, but it is unnecessary for ... us to rely solely on that ground" because
"we do not think it the province of United States district courts to determine the validity
of trademarks which officials of foreign countries have seen fit to grant.").
285. See Packard, 346 F. Supp. at 410 n.2 ("One of [the grounds for forum non conveni-
ens dismissal] may be missing here because the defendant may not be amenable to process
in the foreign countries whose patents are involved.").
286. Id. at 410 ("These considerations, while they are stated in the Vanity Fair opinion
under the heading 'Forum Non Conveniens,' are by their very nature applicable regardless
of whether all the requirements for dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens are
present.").
287. See supra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.
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With the exception of the Mars court, whose discussion of forum
non conveniens was dicta, nearly all s modem courts applying the
forum non conveniens doctrine in transnational intellectual prop-
erty law disputes involving claims arising under both U.S. and for-
eign laws have either dismissed all claims, including those arising
under U.S. intellectual property laws m or none of them,m rather
than dismissing just the foreign claim while retaining jurisdiction
over the U.S. claim. In two modem cases, Creative Technology,
Ltd v. Aztech System PTE, Ltd.1 and Lockman Foundation v.
Evangelical Alliance Mission,'29 parallel proceedings were taking
place in both U.S. and foreign forums, and the U.S. court opted to
defer to the foreign forum to adjudicate the U.S. as well as the for-
eign claims 93 Both courts recognized that the foreign fora clearly
had the ability to apply U.S. copyright law in addition to their own
288. In Stewart v. Adidas A.G., No. 96 Civ. 6670 (DLC), 1997 WL 218431 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 30, 1997), a suit arising under U.S. and German copyright laws, the court dismissed
the claims arising under German law but maintained jurisdiction over the claims arising
under U.S. law. See id. at *1. Unlike the Mars court, however, the Stewart court conducted
a proper forum non conveniens analysis. The court determined that German courts were
an adequate alternative forum, and found that the difficulty of applying German law,
dealing with complicated conflict of laws issues, enforcing the U.S. judgment in Germany,
the lack of a local interest in the claim and the burden it would place on U.S. courts and
jurors, and the location of witnesses and evidence militated in favor of a forum non con-
veniens dismissal, notwithstanding the burden it would place on the plaintiff. See id. at *6-
*8. Importantly, the court recognized that dividing the suit would impose a hardship on
the plaintiff, yet nonetheless determined that this cost was outweighed by the other fac-
tors. See iL at *8.
289. See Murray v. British Broad. Corp., 81 F.3d 287, 289-95 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming
dismissal of claim by British individual against British corporation and its wholly owned
Delaware subsidiary arising under both U.S. and British copyright laws); Lockman Found.
v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 766-72 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming dismissal
of claims arising under both U.S. and Japanese copyright laws).
290. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481,
491-92 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing forum non conveniens dismissal in case brought by British
corporation against U.S. corporations arising under U.S. copyright law and the copyright
laws of 18 foreign nations); Frink America, Inc. v. Champion Rd. Mach. Ltd., 961 F. Supp.
398, 402-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to grant forum non conveniens dismissal in case
brought by U.S. corporation against Canadian corporation under U.S. and Canadian copy-
right laws).
291. 61 F.3d 696 (9th Cir. 1995).
292. 930 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1991).
293. See Creative Tech, 61 F.3d at 698-704 (affirming dismissal of claim by Singapore
corporation against Singapore corporation and its wholly owned California subsidiary
arising under U.S. copyright law in favor of parallel proceeding in Singapore in which
claim arising under Singapore copyright law was already being adjudicated); Lockman,
930 F.2d at 766-72 (affirming dismissal of claims arising under U.S. and Japanese copyright
laws in favor of parallel proceeding in Japan in which claim arising under Japanese copy-
right law was already being adjudicated).
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law,2 94 and both conducted a complete and thorough forum non
conveniens analysis. Each court considered the adequacy of the
alternative forum and the desirability of litigating in the foreign fo-
rum versus in the U.S. forum based on a balancing of the public
and private interest factors.295 Most importantly, however, both
courts gave close attention and appropriate weight to the private
interest in the ease, expediency, and expense of the litigation: the
Creative court held that this factor weighed in favor of dismissal
because the Singapore court was at a more advanced stage than
the U.S. action was,296 and the Lockman court stressed that this
factor weighed in favor of dismissal because "trying all claims in
one case ... would prevent fragmented litigation. ' '297 A similar
concern over avoiding fragmented litigation has also motivated
some courts to deny a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds. For example, in Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers,
Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co.,298 the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's forum non conveniens dismissal of claims arising under the
copyright laws of 18 foreign nations.29 Just like the Creative and
Lockman courts, the Boosey court emphasized the private interest
in the ease, expediency, and expense of the litigation, noting that
the effect of the dismissal was "to split the suit into 18 parts in 18
nations, complicate the suit, delay it, and render it more expen-
sive," and concluding that "trial would be more 'easy, expeditious
and inexpensive' in the district court than dispersed to 18 foreign
nations." 300
Fairness to both plaintiffs and defendants, as well as the interest
that courts of all nations have in judicial economy, militate in favor
of giving great weight to the avoidance of "piece-meal" litigation
294. See Creative Tech, 61 F.3d at 703 ("If our courts can entertain actions under the
copyright laws of foreign nations, we see no reason why the High Court of Singapore is
incapable of doing the same if need be."); Lockman, 930 F.2d at 768 (noting that there is
credible evidence suggesting that Japanese courts will apply U.S. copyright law as well as
Japanese copyright law). See also Skelton Fibres, Ltd. v. Canas, No. 96 Civ. 6031 DLC,
1997 WL 97835, at "1, *3-*6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 1997) (dismissing on forum non conveniens
grounds claims by British and New York corporations against Delaware corporation aris-
ing solely under U.S. copyright law in favor of Spanish forum).
295. See Creative Tech, 61 F.3d at 701-04; Lockman, 930 F.2d at 768-71.
296. See Creative Tech, 61 F.3d at 703.
297. Lockman, 930 F.2d at 770.
298. 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 1998).
299. See id. at 491-92. The plaintiff had also brought a claim arising under U.S. copy-
right law, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and
the appeals court affirmed. See id at 492-93.
300. Id. at 492 (citations omitted).
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in the forum non conveniens analysis. However, the other Gulf
Oil factors are not irrelevant; they remain critical to deciding
whether the United States or the alternative forum is the more ap-
propriate forum in which to hear the suit. The importance of
avoiding piecemeal litigation is merely that once the Gulf Oil fac-
tors point in the direction of a particular forum, the case should be
heard in that forum in toto.
Although by far the most common "sin" of courts applying the
forum non conveniens doctrine in transnational intellectual prop-
erty disputes is to improperly dismiss a case, at least some courts
make the error of retaining jurisdiction over a case that could bet-
ter be resolved elsewhere. The improper retention of a case is no
better than the improper dismissal of one, as both types of errors
waste judicial and private resources. Moreover, retaining jurisdic-
tion when the dispute is currently being adjudicated elsewhere
shows disrespect for foreign courts, which may result in retaliatory
treatment by those courts when U.S. courts adjudicate transna-
tional disputes, including a refusal to enforce U.S. judgments.
Perhaps the best example of a situation in which a U.S. court
should have dismissed a case on forum non conveniens grounds
but did not was in Black & Decker Corp. v. Sanyei America
Corp.,30 decided by the same U.S. district court that decided
Packard. In Black & Decker, the plaintiffs brought suit against de-
fendant Sanyei America Corporation, a wholly owned U.S. sub-
sidiary of Sanyei, a Hong Kong corporation, in a U.S. court for
trademark infringement arising under U.S. law.= They brought a
separate suit against Sanyei Electric, the U.S. defendant's Hong
Kong sister corporation and subsidiary of Sanyei, in Hong Kong
court for trademark infringement arising under Hong Kong law.30
The U.S. defendant offered to either submit to the jurisdiction of
the Hong Kong court or, in the alternative, have its sister corpora-
tion submit to the jurisdiction of the U.S. court, at the plaintiffs'
choice, "[i]n an effort to litigate in a single forum."'z Accordingly,
the U.S. defendant wanted the U.S. court to either stay the U.S.
proceeding or issue an antisuit injunction once the plaintiffs made
their choice.305 The U.S. court recharacterized the defendant's mo-
tion for a stay as a request for a forum non conveniens dismissal,
301. 650 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. 111.1986).
302. See id. at 407-10.
303. Seek.
304. Id at408.
305. See iL at 407.
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and denied it on the grounds that most of the witnesses were lo-
cated in the United States, that the claim arose under U.S. law for
an action occurring in the United States, and that the defendants
were U.S. citizens.3 6 Although the location of witnesses and the
local interest in having a dispute arising in the United States adju-
dicated in the United States are clearly relevant in the forum non
conveniens calculus, that the defendants are U.S. citizens and that
U.S. law will be applied are not relevant. Moreover, the court
failed to weigh the inconvenience to the defendants in this calcu-
lus. If declining the defendant's offer in this case was not mis-
guided, it is hard to imagine what is! Even more troublesome,
however, was the court's simultaneous refusal to grant an antisuit
injunction, as it put the defendants in a no-win situation: the
court's forum non conveniens analysis suggested that the United
States was the better forum in which to adjudicate the claim, yet
the U.S. court would not issue an injunction to prevent the plain-
tiffs from simultaneously adjudicating their claim abroad. °7 Ac-
cordingly, this case provides strong support for the premise that
the forum non conveniens and antisuit injunction decisions ought
not to be considered independently of one another.38
In sum, when a plaintiff brings suit in a U.S. court raising claims
arising under both U.S. and foreign intellectual property laws, the
U.S. court should neither automatically grant nor automatically
deny a motion to dismiss the case on forum non conveniens
grounds.3°9 However, because so many of the public and private
interest factors weigh against hearing such cases in a piece-meal
fashion, the court's overriding consideration should be to either re-
tain or dismiss the case in toto, determining the selection of forum
by the usual balancing of the remaining private and public interest
factors. Indeed, there are very few circumstances under which a
U.S. court would be justified in retaining a U.S. intellectual prop-
erty claim while dismissing the foreign intellectual property claim.
The first scenario occurs when the U.S. court only has subject mat-
306. See i&L at 410 & n.1.
307. For a more thorough analysis of the court's discussion of the antisuit injunction,
see infra Part VI.
308. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 531 F. Supp. 710,715 (D.
Minn. 1982) (holding that the reasons for the court's refusal to issue a forum non conveni-
ens dismissal constitute the exact reasons why the court would issue an antisuit injunc-
tion).
309: The same considerations apply when a plaintiff brings a claim in a U.S. court aris-
ing under U.S. intellectual property law while a parallel action is taking place in a foreign
forum arising under foreign intellectual property laws.
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ter jurisdiction over the U.S. claim and the foreign forum only has
subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign claim. In that scenario,
fairness to the plaintiff requires that the U.S. court retain jurisdic-
tion over the U.S. claim t° The second scenario occurs when the
U.S. court only has jurisdiction over the U.S. claim and the foreign
forum has jurisdiction over both the U.S. and foreign claims, but
the foreign forum is an inadequate one, because it is biased, cor-
rupt, incompetent, or would otherwise result in an unfair trial,311 or
if the plaintiff lacks physical access to the foreign forum.31 Obvi-
ously, a plaintiff should not be forced to have his claims heard in a
proceeding which would not honor his due process rights, and
would thus prevent his judgment from having preclusive effect un-
der Hilton.313 The third scenario occurs when the U.S. court has
jurisdiction over both claims, and the foreign forum has jurisdic-
tion over only the foreign claim, but the foreign court would not
enforce the U.S. judgment.314 Under such circumstances, adjudi-
cating the foreign claim would simply be a waste of resources, so
the U.S. court should retain jurisdiction over only the U.S. claim.31 5
Absent these circumstances, it is unlikely that any benefits of
310. A different analysis applies where the problem is not one of subject matter juris-
diction but is rather one of personal jurisdiction. Since the latter can be waived by the par-
ties, a U.S. court can condition a forum non conveniens dismissal on the defendant agree-
ing to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign forum. See, e.g., Harrison v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 510 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
311. See, e.g., Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Compania de Acero del Pacifico, SA,
528 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding foreign forum inadequate where the
judiciary lacked independence from the military government and where the defendant was
a state-owned entity), affd on other grounds, 727 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1984); Phoenix Canada
Oil Co. Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 455-56 (D. DeL 1978) (finding foreign forum
inadequate where the judiciary lacked independence in that the military government had
the power to intervene in and veto judicial proceedings).
312. See e.g., Rasoulzadeh v. Associated Press, 574 F. Supp. 854, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(finding foreign forum inadequate where there was high probability that plaintiff would be
killed if he entered the country), affd 767 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1985); Fiorenza v. United
States Steel Int'l Ltd., 311 F. Supp. 117, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (finding foreign forum in-
adequate where plaintiff would not be given visa to enter foreign nation).
313. See supra text accompanying note 208.
314. See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 647 & n.20 (2d Cir.
1956) (retaining claim arising under U.S. patent law, but dismissing on forum non con-
veniens grounds claim arising under Canadian patent law where there was concern over
the willingness of the Canadian government to honor such a judgment).
315. Indeed, the U.S. should retain jurisdiction over the U.S. claim, while dismissing the
foreign claim, even if the foreign forum has jurisdiction over both claims, for to the extent
that the judgment arising under U.S. law will need to be enforced in a U.S. court, the for-
eign judgment would not be entitled to preclusive effect in a U.S. court under Hilton. See
supra text accompanying note 209.
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hearing the intellectual property claims in separate fora will out-
weigh the costs to the litigants and to the judicial system.
VI. ANTISUIT INJUNCTIONS IN TRANSNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
The weight to be given to international comity is at the heart of
the debate among the United States Courts of Appeals over the
conditions under which a federal district court should issue an an-
tisuit injunction barring a party before it from adjudicating a par-
allel claim in a foreign proceeding before the U.S. court has en-
tered a final judgment.316 Those courts employing the more
restrictive standard "champion[] the importance of comity," 317
authorizing the issuance of antisuit injunctions only where the
party requesting the antisuit injunction can prove that a failure to
do so would either deprive the U.S. court of jurisdiction over the
matter or result in the evasion of an important public policy of the
U.S. forum.318 Those courts employing the relaxed standard
authorize the issuance of antisuit injunctions where there is dupli-
cation of the parties and issues and where the court determines
that the prosecution of the foreign suit is "vexatious." '319 While the
First,320 Second,321 Third,3 2 Sixth,323 Eleventh,324 and District of
316. See Steven R. Swanson, The Vexatiousness of a Vexation Rule: International Com-
ity and Antisuit Injunctions, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 1-4 (1996).
317. Id. at 3.
318. See Haig Najarian, Note, Granting Comity Its Due: A Proposal to Revive the Com-
ity-Based Approach to Transnational Antisuit Injunctions, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 961, 969
(1994).
319. See Arif S. Haq, Note, Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp.: Comity in International Judi-
cial Relations, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 365,377 (1996).
320. See Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 577-79 (1st
Cir. 1969) (vacating district court's issuance of antisuit injunction, citing concerns over
"comity").
321. See China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir.
1987) (reversing district court's issuance of antisuit injunction where there was no threat to
the domestic court's jurisdiction or to a strong public policy of the forum).
322. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877,
887 (3d Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (reversing district court's
issuance of antisuit injunction, finding that the duplication of issues and the harassing and
vexatious nature of proceedings were not, standing alone, sufficient to overcome comity
concerns).
323. See Gau Shan Co., Ltd. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349, 1354-58 (6th Cir.
1992) (directing district court to rescind its antisuit injunction, and opting to follow the
more restrictive standard of the Second and District of Columbia Circuits).
324. See Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 3 F.3d 442 (11th Cir. 1993) (af-
firming without opinion district court's refusal to issue antisuit injunction, where district
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Columbia3 5 Circuits favor the restrictive standard, the Fifth,
Seventh,3z7 Eighthm and Ninth3S Circuits favor the relaxed stan-
dard. Although such a wide split makes this issue "ripe for a Su-
preme Court decision, '330 and notwithstanding repeated opportu-
nities to resolve the question,33' the Supreme Court has repeatedly
refused to determine the proper standard for issuing antisuit in-
junctions.3r
Before examining the competing standards employed by the
United States Courts of Appeals for issuing antisuit injunctions, it
is important to summarize the conclusions that this Comment has
drawn thus far. First, federal courts are in many instances author-
ized to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising un-
der foreign intellectual property laws. 3 Second, the modem act
of state doctrine does not prevent federal courts from adjudicating
court focused on comity and chose to follow the restrictive standard), aff'g 805 F. Supp.
919 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
325. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,927 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's issuance of antisuit injunction, but holding that anti-
suit injunctions should be issued only where there is a threat to the domestic court's juris-
diction or to a strong public policy of the forum).
326. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 626-27 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming
district court's issuance of antisuit injunction, holding that it is appropriate to issue antisuit
injunctions to prevent vexatious litigation).
327. See Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425,431 (7th Cir. 1993)
(affirming district court's issuance of antisuit injunction, and noting that the 7th Circuit
"lean[s] toward the laxer standard").
32& See Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 664 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1981) (af-
firming district court's issuance of antisuit injunction based on a forum non conveniens-
type analysis).
329. See Seattle Totems v. National Hockey League, 652 F.2d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 1981)
(affirming district court's issuance of antisuit injunction where allowing multiple actions
would result in unnecessary delay, inconvenience, expense, and inconsistent rulings).
330. Swanson, supra note 316, at 3.
331: See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21-24, Altai, Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l,
Inc., 118 S. Ct. 1676 (1998) (No. 97-1417) (requesting that the Supreme Court establish a
uniform standard for the issuance of foreign antisuit injunctions); Petition for Writ of Cer-
tiorari at 3-4, Northwest Sports Enterprises, Ltd. v. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc., 457
U.S. 1105 (1982) (No. 81-738) (requesting that the Supreme Court reverse the Ninth Cir-
cuit's relaxed standard for issuing antisuit injunctions and instead adopt the Third Circuit's
standard); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-20, Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (No. 81-290) (requesting that the Su-
preme Court reverse the Third Circuit's determination that vexatiousness, standing alone,
is insufficient to justify issuance of an antisuit injunction).
332. See Altai, Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1676 (1998) (denying certio-
rari); Northwest Sports Enterprises, Ltd. v. Seattle Totems Hockey Club, Inc., 457 U.S.
1105 (1982) (denying certiorari); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (affirming on other grounds and declining to con-
sider proper standard for issuance of antisuit injunctions).
333. See supra Part II & Table 1.
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claims arising under foreign intellectual property laws.' Third,
where a party has litigated a claim arising under the intellectual
property laws of one nation to final judgment, federal courts pos-
sess doctrinal authority to apply both the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel to prevent that party from adjudicating a
claim involving the same idea or invention under the intellectual
property laws of another nation in a separate proceeding?35
Fourth, application of the forum non conveniens doctrine in trans-
national intellectual property should result in holding the trial in a
single forum rather than holding separate trials in every nation
whose intellectual property laws are implicated. 336 With these con-
clusions in the background, this Part makes the following three as-
sertions. First, in resolving the split among the circuits, the Su-
preme Court should adopt the relaxed standard. Second, although
it appears an antisuit injunction might not be appropriate under
either the restrictive or the relaxed standard where transnational
intellectual property issues are at stake, such a belief is based on
erroneous conclusions that courts have made regarding subject
matter jurisdiction. Finally, under either standard, it is proper for a
district court to issue an antisuit injunction after it has entered a fi-
nal judgment.
A. History of Domestic Antisuit Injunctions: The Roots of the
Restrictive Standard
To understand the rationale for using the restrictive standard in
issuing antisuit injunctions, one must first examine the historical
treatment of domestic antisuit injunctions in the United States, viz,
the standard under which a federal court can enjoin proceedings in
a state court, and vice-versa.33 7
Congressional grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts have
included a "longstanding prohibition" against federal court injunc-
tions staying state court proceedings. 38 This prohibition origi-
nated in the Judiciary Act of 1793, which provided simply that "a
writ- of injunction [shall not] be granted [by any court of the
334. See supra Part III.
335. See supra Part IV.
336. See supra Part V.
337. See Swanson, supra note 316 at 12 & n.89.
338. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398
U.S. 281,282-83 (1970).
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United States] to stay proceedings in any court of a state."' 9 Al-
though the plain meaning of this simple sentence seems apparent,
subsequent judicial interpretations have created a number of ex-
ceptions to this rule.340 The only express statutory exception was
for bankruptcy proceedings;3 1 however, the Supreme Court has
implied statutory exceptions for, inter alia, the removal of actions
from state to federal court342 and for interpleader actions-4 based
on the Court's interpretation of congressional statutes providing
for those actions. In addition to these congressionally authorized
exceptions, the Supreme Court created two major common law
exceptions to the prohibition on domestic antisuit injunctions:
where the proceeding at issue is in rem, or to prevent a party from
relitigating in state court a matter finally decided by a federal
court.344 Notwithstanding a historical willingness to read excep-
tions into the provision that did not comport with its plain lan-
guage, the Supreme Court abruptly reversed course in Toucey v.
New York Life Ins. Co.,35 preserving the "in rem" exception as
consistent with the underlying rationale for the Judiciary Act of
1793, but eliminating the "relitigation" exception because it
"patently violates the expressed prohibition of Congress. '" 7 The
339. Judiciary Act of March 2, 1793, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335 (current version as amended at
28 U.S.C § 2283 (1994)).
340. See generally Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132-41 (1941) (dis-
cussing various exceptions to the rule against federal court injunctions staying state court
proceedings).
341. The provision was expressly amended to provide that "[tihe writ of injunction shall
not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a
State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy." Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231,36 Stat. 1087, 1162,28 U.S.C. § 379
(current version as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994)).
342. Because the Removal Acts, commencing with the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 12, 1
Stat. 73, provided that after the procedures for removal are met, a state court "shall ...
proceed no further in the cause," the Supreme Court has held "that the Removal Acts
qualifypro tanto the Act of 1793." Toucey, 314 U.S. at 133 (citing Kline v. Burke Constr.
Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S.
239 (1905); Dietzsch v. Huidekoper, 103 U.S. 494 (1880)).
343. Under the Interpleader Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 416, Congress provided that,
"[n]otwithstanding any provision of the Judicial Code to the contrary, [a district] court
shall have power to ... enjoin[ parties] from instituting any suit or proceeding in any State
court or in any other Federal court." The Supreme Court interpreted this provision as
creating an exception to the Judiciary Act of 1793. See Toucey, 314 U.S. at 133-34 (citing
Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 74 (1939); Dugas v. American Surety Co.,
300 U.S. 414,428 (1937)).
344. See Toucey, 314 U.S. at 134-41.
345. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
346z See id. at 134-36, 139.
347. Id. at 139 (footnote omitted).
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Toucey court described the 1793 anti-injunction act "[a]s part of
the delicate adjustments required by our federalism," and de-
scribed the rationale of the act as "express[ing] the desire of Con-
gress to avoid friction between the federal government and the
states resulting from the intrusion of federal authority into the or-
derly functioning of a state's judicial process." 349
In 1948, seven years after Toucey was decided, Congress
amended the anti-injunction provision to include three exceptions:
"[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay
proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act
of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to pro-
tect or effectuate its judgments. ' 350 The express bankruptcy excep-
tion in the previous version was eliminated, as the general excep-
tion for any injunctions expressly authorized by Acts of Congress
was intended to encompass the bankruptcy exception.51 Moreo-
ver, the phrase "in aid of its jurisdiction" was added to clarify that
federal courts had the power to stay proceedings in state courts
that were removed to federal court. 2  Most importantly, the
clause "to protect or effectuate its judgments" was added to "re-
store-] the basic law as generally understood and interpreted prior
to the Toucey decision" that federal courts possess power to enjoin
relitigation in state courts of cases fully adjudicated in federal
court.35 3 The anti-injunction provision has not been amended by
Congress since 1948, and the Supreme Court has subsequently in-
terpreted the provision strictly, holding that "any injunction
against state court proceedings otherwise proper under general
equitable principles must be based on one of the specific statutory
exceptions to § 2283 if it is to be upheld," and that "the exceptions
should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction."35
4
In Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson,355 decided
two years prior to Toucey, the Supreme Court confronted a situa-
tion in which a federal and a state court had each enjoined the par-
348. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
349. Id. at 135.
350. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 968 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1994)).
351. See Historical and Revision Notes to the 1948 Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1994).
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398
U.S. 281,287 (1970).
355. 305 U.S. 456 (1939).
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ties before them from proceeding in the other forum.S In Prin-
cess Lida, the Supreme Court set forth the general rule regarding
parallel proceedings between state and federal courts:
[W]here the judgment sought is strictly in personam,
both the state court and the federal court, having
concurrent jurisdiction, may proceed with the litiga-
tion at least until judgment is obtained in one of
them which may be set up as res judicata in the
other. On the other hand, if the two suits are in
rem, or quasi in rem, ... the jurisdiction of the one
court must yield to that of the other.351
The Supreme Court determined that because the proceeding
was quasi in rem, and because the first proceeding was initiated in
the state court, it was proper for the state court to enjoin the par-
ties from proceeding in federal court.3 s In Donovan v. City of
Dallas,359 decided after Toucey, the Supreme Court confirmed the
Princess Lida "in rem" exception to the "general rule... that state
and federal courts would not interfere with or try to restrain each
other's proceedings," 3 ° but held that "state courts are completely
without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in perso-
nam actions. 361 The Donovan court's rationale appeared to be
grounded in the Supremacy Clause, in that the Court noted that
the right to present the issue in federal court "was granted by
Congress and cannot be taken away by the State."'
Thus Donovan, like Toucey, is grounded primarily in notions of
federalism. The Supreme Court has more recently confirmed this
federalism rationale for the provision in Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, noting that
the 1793 anti-injunction act served as one of the "lines of demarca-
tion between the two systems"'- designed "to make the dual system
work and 'to prevent needless friction between state and federal
courts,"- and that it "in part rests on the fundamental constitu-
356. See id. at 461.
357. l& at 466 (footnotes omitted).
35& See id. at 467-68.
359. 377 U.S. 408 (1964).
360. Id. at 412.
361. lId at 413.
362- Id.
363. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
364. Id. at 286.
365. Id (citation omitted).
1999]
390 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
tional independence of the States and their courts. ' '36 This feder-
alism rationale for domestic antisuit injunctions is important to
bear in mind, for those circuits favoring the use of the restrictive
standard for issuing foreign antisuit injunctions rely on the domes-
tic antisuit injunction cases for support. However, importing case
law grounded in federalism concerns into the transnational litiga-
tion context is of questionable validity, given that such case law is
based on a constitutional doctrine designed to ensure internal
checks and balances through the maintenance of dual sovereignty.
This rationale is inapposite in the context of transnational intellec-
tual property litigation in which reasonably sophisticated repeat
"players" in an increasingly global economy are primarily inter-
ested in ensuring the efficient resolution of litigation.
B. Development of the Restrictive Standard
Although the District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines 67 and the Second
Circuit's decision in China Trade and Development Corp. v. M.V.
Choong Yong" represent the modern restatement of the restric-
tive standard for issuing foreign antisuit injunctions, the restrictive
standard in the international litigation context actually has its roots
in the First Circuit's decision in Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v.
Lear-Siegler, Inc.3 69 and the Third Circuit's decision in Compagnie
Des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of North America,370 upon
which both the Laker Airway371 and China Trade372 courts relied.
In Canadian Filters, a Canadian corporation brought suit against
a Delaware corporation, raising claims arising under both U.S. and
Canadian patent laws.373 The trial court enjoined the Delaware
corporation from bringing a separate suit in a Canadian court to
litigate the Canadian patent rights, but did not rule on whether or
not it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the Canadian patent claim, in-
stead reserving that ruling pending its adjudication of the U.S. pat-
ent right.374 On appeal, the First Circuit stressed the importance of
366. Id. at 287.
367. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
368: 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
369. 412 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1969).
370. 651 F.2d 877 (3d Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
371. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927 n.50, 928 nn.52 & 57, 929 nn.59 & 63, 931 n.69.
372. See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36.
373. See Canadian Filters, 412 F.2d at 577-78.
374. See id. at 578.
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comity, which it defined as "a blend of courtesy and expedi-
ence, ' '375 and vacated the injunction.376 In support of its contention
that the principle of comity militated in favor of vacating the anti-
suit--injunction, the Canadian Filters court cited to two cases deal-
ing with the domestic anti-injunction act-Toucey and Donovan-
and reasoned that "[t]he Congressional policy upon which 28
U.S.C. § 2283 is based should, a fortiori, be reflected by a self-
imposed reluctance to interfere with courts of foreign coun-
tries." However, we learned from Toucey and its progeny that
the Congressional policy underlying the domestic anti-injunction
act is federalism, 78 not comity, and so it is unclear that the analogy
holdsY9
In Compagnie des Bauxites, the Third Circuit relied on Dono-
van,-Princess Lida, and Canadian Filters for its conclusion that du-
plicative, harassing and vexatious parallel litigation is not enough,
standing alone, to justify "the breach of comity among the courts
of separate sovereignties" that would result from the issuance of
an antisuit injunction prohibiting the defendant from pursuing
parallel litigation in England. The Compagnie des Bauxites
court cited Donovan for the proposition that "[t]he general princi-
ple established '[e]arly in our history,' is that one court will not in-
terfere with or try to restrain proceedings in another in an ordinary
action in personam."' l  However, Donovan actually held that
"[early in the history of our country a general rule was established
that state and federal courts would not interfere with or try to re-
strain each other's proceedings."' The Compagnies des Bauxites
court also cited the Princess Lida holding that where parallel pro-
ceedings are taking place in state and federal courts, both will be
permitted to "proceed... until judgment is obtained in one of
them which may be [pled] as res judicata in the other. '*0 After
375. Id. (footnote omitted).
376. See id. at 579.
377. Id. at 578.
37M See supra text accompanying notes 348-49,362-64.
379. The Canadian Fdters court also found it salient that the district court had not even
reached the question whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the Canadian patent
claim, and concluded that the court "cannot recognize lay-away jurisdiction as a basis for
enjoining other proceedings." 412 F.2d at 579.
380. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of No. Am., 651 F.2d 877,
887 (3d Cir. 1981), affd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
381. Id. at 887 (citing Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408,412 (1964)).
382. See Donovan, 377 U.S. at 412 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
383. See Compagnie des Bauxites, 651 F.2d at 887 (quoting Princess Lida v. Thompson,
305 U.S. 456,466 (1939)).
1999]
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
stating these principles, the Compagnie des Bauxites court boldly
asserted that "[t]his principle has often been applied in cases simi-
lar to the present case where one of the actions is in a foreign ju-
risdiction.""38 Notwithstanding its use of the word "often," the
Compagnie des Bauxites court cited the only case that had ever so
held, namely Canadian Filters.
At this early stage in the development of the restrictive princi-
ple, the Supreme Court avoided the opportunity to address the
"unwarranted extension" of Donovan into the international litiga-
tion context.3" In its petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court, Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea pointed out that
Donovan involved federal-state relations and the right to litigate in
federal court based on a congressional grant of jurisdiction, and
stressed that neither of these concerns are implicated where for-
eign antisuit injunctions are at issue.386 However, the Supreme
Court did not address this issue and decided the case on other
grounds.387
Relying in part on this questionable doctrinal background, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, in Laker Airways
Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,38 became "the first court
to provide a definitive [foreign antisuit injunction] standard con-
sidering international comity concerns."38 9  The Laker Airways
court rejected the idea of issuing an antisuit injunction to avoid
duplicative and vexatious litigation, and, citing both Compagnie
des Bauxites and Canadian Filters, held that such considerations
"do not outweigh the important principles of comity that compel
deference and mutual respect for concurrent foreign proceed-
ings.''39° Because of the primacy of comity in this context, the
Laker Airways court indicated only two situations in which foreign
antisuit injunctions were appropriate: to protect the jurisdiction of
the enjoining court, or to prevent a litigant's evasion of an impor-
tant public policy of the U.S. forum.39' The Laker Airways court
384. Id. (citing Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577 (1st
Cir. 1969)) (emphasis added).
385. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694 (1982) (No. 81-290).
386. See id. at 12.
387. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinea, 456
U.S. 694 (1982).
388. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
389. Swanson, supra note 316, at 2.
390. Laker, 731 F.2d at 928 & nn.52 & 57.
391. See id. at 927.
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appeared to limit its notion of protecting jurisdiction to the situa-
tion in which a foreign court "attempts to carve out exclusive ju-
risdiction over concurrent actions," 392 viz, by threatening the par-
ties with an antisuit injunction prohibiting them from litigating in
the U.S. forum, in which case the U.S. court is actually issuing an
anti-antisuit injunction. As to the public policy exception, the
Laker Airways court held that "the availability of slight advantages
in the substantive or procedural law to be applied in the foreign
court does not signify an actionable evasion of domestic public
policy," and concluded that "[a]n impermissible evasion is much
more likely to be found when the party attempts to elude compli-
ance with a statute of specific applicability upon which the party
seeking an injunction may have relied, and which is designed to ef-
fectuate important state policies. 393 Notably, although the Laker
Airways court rejected the notion of importing the liberal vexa-
tiousness standard from the forum non conveniens dismissal stan-
dard,391 it had no difficulty importing from the forum non conveni-
ens standard the idea that slight differences in substantive or
procedural law should not compel the issuance of an antisuit in-
junction. 95 Unfortunately, the Laker Airways court failed to pro-
vide a principled reason for why antisuit injunctions are only
sometimes like forum non conveniens dismissals.
In China Trade and Development Corp. v. M. V. Choong Yong,396
the Second Circuit "refined the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Laker
Airways to an explicit two-factor test.'" 31 In China Trade, the dis-
trict court had issued an antisuit injunction to prevent the defen-
dant from pursuing parallel litigation in Korea.393 In deciding to
issue the antisuit injunction, the district court relied on American
Home Assurance Co. v. The Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. ,3 in
which the Southern District of New York had set forth two thresh-
old requirements for issuing foreign antisuit injunctions: (1) the
parties in both matters must be the same; and (2) resolution of the
case before the enjoining court must be dispositive of the action to
be enjoined. The American Home court held that if those
392. Id. at 930.
393. Id. at 931 n.73 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)).
394. See id at 928.
395. See id at 931 n.73.
396. 837 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987).
397. Haq, supra note 319, at 380.
39& See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 34.
399. 603 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
400. See id. at 643.
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threshold conditions are met, the question whether a court should
issue an antisuit injunction depends on the following factors: (1)
frustration of a policy in the enjoining forum; (2) the foreign action
would be vexatious; (3) a threat to the issuing court's in rem or
quasi in rem jurisdiction; (4) the proceedings in the other forum
prejudice other equitable considerations; or (5) adjudication of the
same issues in separate fora would result in delay, inconvenience,
expense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment.40 1 Because the dis-
trict court in China Trade found that the threshold requirements
were met, and also found that parallel litigation would be vexa-
tious to the plaintiffs and would result in expense and a race to
judgment, it issued an antisuit injunction.402
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's issu-
ance of an antisuit injunction.0 3 The China Trade court cited to
Laker Airways, Compagnie des Bauxites, Canadian Filters, Dono-
van, and Princess Lida to support its general conclusion that "the
initiation before a foreign court of a suit concerning the same par-
ties and issues as a suit already pending in a United States court
does not, without more, justify enjoining a party from proceeding
in the foreign forum."'  Although the China Trade court agreed
with the threshold requirements set forth in American Home, it
concluded that "[h]aving due regard to the interests of comity" re-
quires that an antisuit injunction be issued only if one of two con-
ditions are met: (1) the foreign action threatens the jurisdiction of
the enjoining forum; or (2) strong public policies of the enjoining
forum are threatened by the foreign action.40" The China Trade
court found the remaining three American Home factors unhelpful
because they "are likely to be present whenever parallel actions
are proceeding concurrently."'
401. See id.
402. See China Trade, 837 F.2d at 35.
403. See id. at 37.
404. Id. at 36.
405. I&
406. Id. After establishing its new test for issuing antisuit injunctions, the China Trade
court concluded that neither condition was satisfied. In the court's view, there was no
need to protect its jurisdiction because the Korean court had not "attempt[ed] to carve out
exclusive jurisdiction over the action" by itself issuing an antisuit injunction barring the
parties from litigating in the U.S. proceeding. Id. at 36-37. Moreover, the court concluded
that mere speculation that one party was attempting to race to judgment in the Korean
court was insufficient to support the conclusion that they were attempting to evade the
important public policies of the forum. See id. at 37.
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The remaining circuits to weigh in in favor of the restrictive
standard did not significantly add to the underlying doctrine. The
Sixth Circuit, in Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.,4° made the
public policy exception even harder to meet by questioning
whether the public policy of a state, as opposed to a national pub-
lic policy, could ever outweigh concerns for international comity.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Mutual Service Casualty Insur-
ance Co. v. Frit Industries, Inc.,' which merely affirmed the dis-
trict court without opinion, is notable only for the district court's
revisionist characterization of Donovan and Princess Lida as rep-
resenting a "principle of comity" rather than a principle of feder-
alism, and for its ability, because of the compounding of an error
across the circuits, to provide a significantly longer list of cases to
support the proposition that this principle "has often been applied
to cases where one of the actions is in a foreign jurisdiction. '410
C. Fault Lines in the Modern Restrictive Standard
Disregarding the dubious doctrinal underpinnings of the restric-
tive standard, signs are present that the restrictive standard is be-ginning to lose ground even in those jurisdictions that subscribe to
it. In particular, district courts within the Second Circuit, in which
antisuit injunctions appear to be most frequently adjudicated, are
no longer being completely faithful to the strict standard set forth
in China Trade. These developments are of critical importance in
the transnational intellectual property dispute context, for the
ability of courts to prevent strategic behavior by litigants is signifi-
cantly hampered by their inability under the China Trade standard
to enjoin litigants from prosecuting subsequent or parallel suits in
foreign fora.
The China Trade court clearly held that only two of the five
American Home factors-whether the foreign action threatens the
jurisdiction of the enjoining forum and whether strong public poli-
cies of the enjoining forum are threatened by the foreign action-
wer1e of any significance in determining whether to issue an anti-
suit injunction, holding that a "district court abused its discretion"
407. 956 F.2d 1349 (6th Cir. 1992).
408. See id at 1358.
409. 3 F.3d 442 (11th Cir. 1993), af'g without opinion 805 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ala.
1992).
410. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., 805 F. Supp. 919, 923 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
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where both of these factors were lacking.411 Nonetheless, courts
within the Southern District of New York continue to cite to
American Home and to consider all five of its enumerated fac-
tors. 12 Although some of these courts qualify their citation to
American Home by indicating that the Second Circuit has limited
the issuance of an antisuit injunction to those situations in which
either the first or third American Home factors are present,413 one
court has simply indicated that American Home was "cited with
approval" in China Trade, without indicating that its approval was
limited to two of the five factors.414 Most recently, one court has
cited the American Home test with no mention whatsoever of
China Trade!415 In at least one of these recent cases, the court is-
sued an antisuit injunction because the American Home threshold
requirements were met and because "adjudication of the same is-
sues in separate actions could result in delay, inconvenience, ex-
pense, inconsistency, or a race to judgment. 4 16 Given that the dis-
trict court in China Trade had made these same findings plus a
finding of vexatiousness,4 7 this holding clearly does not comport
with the Second Circuit's restrictive standard.
Moreover, these recent cases are also "relaxing" the Second
Circuit's restrictive standard by making liberal use of the public
policy exception. For example, they have found the public policy
exception triggered where the policy at issue is the enforcement of
forum selection agreements,418 a limited liability provision, 419 or
less specifically, "policies that this Court's Orders are intended to
vindicate."420 Without denigrating the importance of these poli-
cies, it is hard to understand how requesting an antisuit injunction
to avoid the possibility of being subject to a slightly higher level of
411. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 36-37.
412 See Nagoya Venture Ltd. v. Bacopulos, No. 96 Civ. 9317, 1998 WL 307079, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 1998); Hamilton Bank, N.A. v. Kookmin Bank, 999 F. Supp. 586, 588
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Farrell Lines Inc. v. Columbus Cello-Poly Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 118, 129-
30 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Laitasalo, 196 B.R. 913, 925 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996); Interna-
tional Fashion Prods., B.V. v. Calvin Klein, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 0982, 1995 WL 92321, at * 2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1995).
413. See Farrell Lines, 32 F. Supp. at 130; International Fashion, 1995 WL 92321, at *2.
414. See Hamilton Bank, 999 F. Supp. at 588.
415. See Nagoya, 1998 WL 307079, at *5.
416. In re Laitasalo, 196 B.R. at 925.
417. See China Trade and Dev. Corp. v. M. V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.
1987).
418. See Farrell Lines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 130; International Fashion, 1995 WL 92321, at
*2.
419. See Farrell Lines, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 130-31.
420. Nagoya Venture, 1998 WL 307079, at *5.
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liability or being required to litigate in a different forum is de-
signed to do much more than "to prevent a party from seeking
'slight advantages in the substantive or procedural law to be ap-
plied in a foreign court.""'42  Indeed, if the difference between a
treble damages remedy in a U.S. forum versus regular damages in
a foreign forum is insufficient under the classic restrictive stan-
dard,42 how can differences in liability limits or forum be suffi-
cient?
Although one can only speculate as to why lower courts within
the Second Circuit are circumventing the restrictive standard set
forth in China Trade, their willingness to do so may signal that the
district courts have found the restrictive standard to be unduly
rigid and thus unworkable in practice. Hopefully, these develop-
ments at the district court level Will encourage the Second Cir-
cuit-and other circuits espousing the restrictive standard-to re-
consider their use of the strict standard for issuing foreign antisuit
injunctions, and will thus strengthen the ability of district courts to
prevent parties in transnational intellectual property disputes from
engaging in strategic behavior.
D. Final Judgment Exception to the Restrictive Standard
Those courts espousing the restrictive standard for issuing for-
eign antisuit injunctions provide for a less restrictive standard
where a party has obtained a final judgment in a U.S. proceeding,
particularly where there is no assurance that the foreign court
would give res judicata effect to the U.S. judgment. In Farrell
Lines Inc. v. Columbus Cello-Poly Corp.,4  a district court within
the Second Circuit explained that "the standard for enjoining for-
eign litigation after the domestic court reaches judgment is
lower."4' Similarly, in Mutual Service Casualty Ins. Co. v. Frit In-
dustries, Inc.,42s a district court within the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that "[w]here one court has already reached a decision,
there is less justification for permitting relitigation by another
court and a court may act to protect the integrity of its judg-
421. China Trade, 837 F.2d at 37 (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,931 n.73 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
422. See Gau Shan Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 956 F.2d 1349,1358 (6th Cir. 1992).
423. 32 F. Supp. 2d 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
424. Id. at 131.
425: 805 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ala. 1992), aff'd without opinion, 3 F.3d 442 (11th Cir.
1993).
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ment."4 26 And as the Seventh Circuit has explained, in discussing
the differences between the restrictive and relaxed standards,
"where inability to plead res judicata might deprive [a party] of the
benefit of its judgment, considerations of comity would not pre-
vent a federal court, even under the strict cases, from enjoining the
[other party] from proceeding, in defiance of the judgment, in a
foreign court."4'
This comports with the District of Columbia Circuit's holding in
Laker Airways, although that court described it not as a lower
standard, but rather as an application of its first exception to the
bar against foreign antisuit injunctions, namely the protection of
jurisdiction.4a The Laker Airways court reasoned that "[w]hen the
injunction is requested after a previous judgment on the merits,
there is little interference with the rule favoring parallel proceed-
ings in matters subject to concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, a court
may freely protect the integrity of its judgments by preventing
their evasion through vexatious or oppressive relitigation. '429
Moreover, assuming arguendo that those Circuits employing the
restrictive standard properly rely on the domestic anti-injunction
act and cases interpreting it for support, the current domestic anti-
injunction act, with its exception for situations in which a federal
court needs "to protect or effectuate its judgments," 430 supports
the conclusion that foreign antisuit injunctions should also be per-
mitted once a final judgment has been entered in the U.S. court.431
Accordingly, even under the restrictive standard for issuing anti-
suit injunctions, when a party has litigated a claim in a U.S. court
under U.S. intellectual property law, and seeks to litigate a subse-
quent claim (or to continue a parallel claim) in a foreign court un-
der foreign intellectual property law that arose from the same
"transaction or occurrence" and over which the U.S. court would
have had subject matter jurisdiction, the U.S. court can enjoin the
parties from litigating in the foreign proceeding.
426. Id. at 922 n.3 (citations omitted).
427. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys. Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 433 (7th Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
428. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 927-31
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
429. Id at 928 (footnotes omitted).
430. See supra text accompanying note 353.
431. See Farrell Lines Inc. v. Columbus Cello-Poly Corp., 32 F. Supp. 2d 118, 131
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Frit Indus., Inc., 805 F. Supp. 919, 922 n.3
(M.D. Ala. 1992) (citations omitted), affd without opinion, 3 F.3d 442 (11th Cir. 1993).
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E. Development of the Relaxed Standard
The relaxed standard finds its roots in two Fifth Circuit cases.
First, in In re Unterweser Reedere4 Gmbh,432 the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed a district court's decision in an admiralty action to enjoin
the German defendant in the U.S. action from filing a parallel suit
in England against the Delaware plaintiff in the U.S. action.4 The
Unterweser court declared that "[a] court of equity has the tradi-
tional power to enjoin parties, properly before it, from litigating in
another court," and held that an injunction is proper "where the
foreign litigation would: (1) frustrate a policy of the forum issuing
the injunction; (2) be vexatious or oppressive; (3) threaten the is-
suing court's in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction; or (4) where the
proceedings prejudice other equitable considerations." 4  In up-
holding the antisuit injunction, the Unterweser court concluded
"that allowing simultaneous prosecution of the same action in a
foreign forum thousands of miles away would result in 'inequitable
hardship' and 'tend to frustrate and delay the speedy and efficient
determination of the cause.' 435 The following year, the Fifth Cir-
cuit reaffirmed this relaxed standard for issuing antisuit injunctions
in Bethell v. Peace,46 where the court held that it is proper for a
U.S. court "to enjoin foreign proceedings which involve the same
parties and the same causes of action" where the foreign suit was
brought either to evade a public policy of the forum or "where the
foreign suit would be vexatious in other respects."'437
Relying on the principles delineated by the Fifth Circuit in Un-
terweser and Bethell, the Ninth Circuit in Seattle Totems Hockey
Club, Inc. v. National Hockey League4' adopted the relaxed stan-
dard for issuing foreign antisuit injunctions. 439 The Seattle Totems
court discussed the substantial limitations placed on federal courts
by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 with respect to the issuance of
domestic antisuit injunctions, but emphasized "that Congress has
432. 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), affd on reh'g en banc, 446 F.2d 907 (1971), vacated on
other grounds sub noram, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
433. See id. at 889-90,896.
434. Id. at 890 (citing 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.19 (2d ed. 1953)).
435. Id. at 896 (quoting Petition of Bloomfield S.S. Co., 422 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970)).
436. 441 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1971).
437. Id. at 498 (citing ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS OF LAW 129-30 (1962)).
The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed its adherence to the relaxed standard set forth in
Unterweser and Bethell. See Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627-28 (5th Cir.
1996).
438. 652 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1981).
439. See id. at 855-56.
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not removed from the federal courts the power to enjoin parties
subject to their jurisdiction from proceeding in the courts of a for-
eign country, leaving the decision to enjoin such actions squarely
within the discretion of the district courts."' The Seattle Totems
court concluded that the inconvenience and expense of parallel
proceedings, coupled with the risk of inconsistent rulings or a race
to judgment, is sufficient to justify the issuance of a foreign antisuit
injunction. 441
Some evidence suggests that the Eighth Circuit has also en-
dorsed the relaxed standard. In a pair of district court cases de-
cided less than one year apart, the Federal District Court for the
District of Minnesota, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research
Corp.442 and in Cargill, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co.,443 issued foreign antisuit injunctions. In Medtronic, the court
found that the case at bar fulfilled Bethell's requirements that the
parties and issues are the same and that resolution of the first ac-
tion would be dispositive of the action to be enjoined,4 and con-
cluded that "the equitable considerations" mitigated in favor of is-
suing the antisuit injunction.445  In Cargill, the district court
expressly adopted the four rationales for issuing foreign antisuit
injunctions delineated in Unterweser and approved of in Seattle
Totems.46 More notable, however, is the Cargill court's willing-
ness to tie the forum non conveniens and antisuit injunction analy-
ses together: the court concluded that the reasons why it refused to
issue a forum non conveniens dismissal constituted the exact rea-
sons why it favored the issuance of an antisuit injunction."7 Only
the Medtronic case was reviewed by the Eighth Circuit, and that
court merely affirmed the issuance of the antisuit injunction with-
out discussing the proper standard to use.448 However, it has been
suggested that because Judge Bright, who authored the Eighth
Circuit's opinion in Medtronic, subsequently dissented vigorously
in China Trade, a case in which he was sitting by designation, the
440. Id. at 855 n.5 (emphasis added).
441. See id. at 856.
442. 518 F. Supp. 946 (D. Minn. 1981), aff'd 664 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1981).
443. 531 F. Supp. 710 (D. Minn. 1982).
444. See Medtronic, 518 F. Supp. at 955.
445. See id. at 956.
446. See Cargill, 531 F. Supp. at 715.
447. See id.
448. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 664 F.2d 660, 665 (8th Cir. 1981).
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combination of the two opinions suggests that Medtronic repre-
sents an implicit endorsement of the relaxed standard*"9
Although several of the Seventh Circuit decisions exhibit some
murkiness,4 0 its modem decisions point in the direction of the re-
laxed standard. In Phillips Medical Systems International v.
Bruetman,451 the Seventh Circuit, without deciding the matter, in-
dicated that the court "incline[d] toward the laxer standard," and
stressed that "[t]his increasingly is one world and we have diffi-
culty seeing why the usual and by no means stringent rules for
limiting duplicative litigation should stop at international bounda-
ries."452 Within the same week, the Seventh Circuit reiterated in
Allendale Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bull Data Systems, Incass that
the court "lean[ed] toward the laxer standard."' 45
In examining the difference between the restrictive and the re-
laxed standard, it is important to understand that those courts fol-
lowing the relaxed standard do not ignore the importance of com-
ity; rather, they refuse to "require a district court to genuflect
before a vague and omnipotent notion of comity," instead requir-
ing the district court to determine whether there is an actual threat
to international comity. s5 Accordingly, a decision to adopt the
relaxed standard in no way devalues the importance of comity, but
merely requires some evidence that comity is likely to be impaired
rather than presuming that it will always be impaired.4 56
449. See Swanson, supra note 316, at 30-31. See also China Trade and Dev. Corp., v.
M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 40 (Bright, ., dissenting) ("[I]n this day of exceedingly
high costs of litigation, where no comity principles between nations are at stake in resolv-
ing a piece of commercial litigation, courts have an affirmative duty to prevent a litigant
from hopping halfway around the world to a foreign court as a means of confusing, obfus-
cating and complicating litigation already pending for trial in a court in this country.").
450. See infra Part VLI
451. 8 F.3d 600 (7th Cir. 1993).
452. Id at 605.
453. 10 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1993).
454. lId at 431.
455. Kaepa, Inc. v. Achilles Corp., 76 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 1996). See also Allendale,
10 F.3d at 432-33 (noting that where "[t]he only concern with international comity is a
purely theoretical one[, it] ought not trump a concrete and persuasive demonstration of
harm to the applicant for the injunction.. ."); Butte Mining PLC v. Smith, 15 F. Supp. 2d
965, 969 n.3 (D. Mont. 1992) (noting that the Ninth Circuit's admonition in Seattle Totemns
v. National Hockey League that the power to enjoin be "used sparingly" implies that
courts should give due regard to international comity concerns); Medtronic, Inc. v. Cata-
lyst Research Corp., 518 F. Supp. 946, 955 (D. Minn.) (noting that "[t]he principle of com-
ity ... demands that the Court use extreme care and restraint in taking any action which
would interfere in any way with the jurisdiction of a foreign court"), affd 664 F.2d 660
(8th Cir. 1981).
456. SeeAllendale, 10F.3d at431.
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Although the circuits that endorse the restrictive standard
slightly outnumber those endorsing the relaxed standard,457 those
circuits espousing the restrictive standard (or who have yet to
adopt a standard) and the Supreme Court should adopt the re-
laxed standard for several reasons. First, the restrictive standard
was developed by the erroneous reliance on cases interpreting the
domestic anti-injunction act, which in its terms and purpose is in-
applicable to injunctions against litigating in foreign fora.458 Sec-
ond, the restrictive standard has proven itself to be unduly restric-
tive and thus unworkable in practice, so much so that even those
courts bound by it nonetheless have found it necessary to circum-
vent it.459 Third, the restrictive standard makes it virtually impos-
sible to check strategic behavior by litigants, particularly in the
transnational intellectual property context. Finally, the restrictive
standard places no weight whatsoever on the burden that parallel
and subsequent proceedings place on litigants as well as the judici-
ary.
F. Differential Treatment of Intellectual Property Disputes under
Both Standards
In cases decided in both jurisdictions espousing the restrictive
standard for issuing foreign antisuit injunctions as well as those es-
pousing the relaxed standard, the courts are unwilling to issue anti-
suit injunctions where the subject matter of the dispute involves
intellectual property rights. In light of the conclusions drawn thus
far in this Comment,'w however, these decisions seem clearly in-
correct.
For example, in Sperry Rand Corp. v. Sunbeam Corp.,46' the
Seventh Circuit, although appearing to endorse the relaxed stan-
dard by looking for evidence of "vexatious or harassing litigation,"
nonetheless reversed the district court's issuance of a foreign anti-
suit injunction, holding that where adjudication of a U.S. trade-
mark right is taking place in a U.S. court, a suit in Germany under
German trademark law does not result in duplication of issues. 62
However, critical to the court's conclusion was its assumption that
a "United States District Court may not adjudicate questions of
457: See supra text accompanying notes 321-30.
458. See supra Part VI.b.
459. See supra Part VI.c.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 334-37.
461. 285 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1960).
462. Id. at 545.
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foreign trademark rights even though the parties to such contro-
versies might be properly before it in another case."' 0 As this
Comment has cast substantial doubt on this conclusion," this ex-
ception for cases involving intellectual property rights, as echoed
by several courts across the circuits, is no longer valid. Further-
more, the subject matter of litigation involving intellectual prop-
erty rights should in no way preclude the use of foreign antisuit
injunctions. Indeed, given that the development and exponential
growth of the Internet puts those who use it in the unique position
of being simultaneously amenable to suit in hundreds of nations at
once for a single act of infringement, the issuance of an antisuit
injunction is even more appropriate in a transnational dispute in-
volving intellectual property rights than its issuance in other types
of disputes.
VII. CONCLUSION
As technology continues to bring the world closer together at an
exponential rate, U.S. federal courts can and must use the tools at
their disposal to avoid strategic behavior by both plaintiffs and de-
fendants in transnational intellectual property disputes designed to
vex-.their opponents at the judicial system's expense. This Com-
ment has shown that federal courts are in many instances author-
ized to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising un-
der foreign intellectual property laws, and that the modem act of
state doctrine does not bar federal courts from adjudicating such
claims. Moreover, this Comment has demonstrated that where a
party has litigated a claim arising under the intellectual property
laws of one nation to final judgment, federal courts possess doc-
trinal authority to apply both the doctrines of res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel to prevent that party from adjudicating a claim in-
volving the same idea or invention under the intellectual property
laws of another nation in a separate proceeding. In addition, this
Comment has shown that the purposes of the forum non conveni-
463. Id. at 544.
464. See supra Part II.
465. See Canadian Filters (Harwich) Ltd. v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 412 F.2d 577, 579 (1st
Cir. 1969) (citing Sperry Rand); Rauland-Borg Corp. v. TCS Management Group, Inc.,
No. 93 C 6096, 1995 WL 31569, at *3-*4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 1995) (citing Sperry Rand and
Black & Decker); Black & Decker Corp. v. Sanyei America Corp., 650 F. Supp. 406, 409-
10 (N.D.II. 1986) (citing Medtronic and Sperry Rand); Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Re-
search Corp., 518 F. Supp. 946, 954-56 & n.9 (D. Minn. 1981) (citing Sperry Rand and Ca-
nadian Filters), affd 664 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1981).
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ens doctrine in transnational intellectual property disputes point in
most circumstances in favor of holding the trial in a single forum
rather than holding separate trials in every nation whose intellec-
tual. property laws are implicated. Finally, this Comment has
demonstrated that as between the restrictive and relaxed standards
for issuing antisuit injunctions, the relaxed standard stands on
more solid doctrinal footing, and has suggested that federal courts
can and should use antisuit injunctions in conjunction with the is-
suance of forum non conveniens dismissals to give parties their
choice of one-but only one-court in which to have their intellec-
tual property disputes adjudicated. Although putting such doc-
trinal tools to work will take significant effort on the part of courts,
this Comment has attempted to develop a comprehensive frame-
work for dealing with transnational intellectual property disputes
as we approach the twenty-first century.
